#### About these slides

- ► These are slides covered in the Academic Year 2015-2016
- They will a priori not be covered this year
- Best usage : scan content to know what is in there, and consult later if you want to know more
- Please report any error / typo ! !
- Note that DLP algorithms is a very active research area today, hence the slides may already be outdated

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# Advanced Cryptography

DLP and Factoring Algorithms

Christophe Petit University of Oxford

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# Discrete logarithms

- Given a cyclic group (G, ◦) (written multiplicatively), a generator g of G and a second element h ∈ G, compute k ∈ Z<sub>|G|</sub> such that g<sup>k</sup> = h
- Trivial if  $(G, \circ) = (\mathbb{F}_p, +)$ . Why?
- ▶ Recently broken if (G, ○) = (𝔽<sup>\*</sup><sub>2<sup>n</sup></sub>, \*) (more generally if characteristic is not too big)
- Believed to be hard (to different extents) for G = ℝ<sup>\*</sup><sub>p</sub> and for (well-chosen) elliptic/hyperelliptic curve groups

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#### Integer factorization

- Given a composite number *n*, compute its (unique) factorization  $n = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  where  $p_i$  are prime numbers
- Equivalently (why?) : compute one non-trivial factor p<sub>i</sub>
- Trivial if  $n = p^e$
- ▶ Believed to be hard if n = pq for well-chosen  $p \neq q$

# RSA and Diffie-Hellman

## Related assumptions

- DLP broken implies Diffie-Hellman broken
- Factorization broken implies RSA broken
- ► We don't know whether DH broken implies DLP broken
- We don't know whether RSA broken implies factorization broken
- Nevertheless, the best attacks against DH and RSA today are discrete log and factorization attacks

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Outline

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- The cryptography literature includes many other, somewhat related assumptions
- Some of them are equivalent to DLP or factoring
- Some of them are strictly weaker/stronger
- Many interesting open problems
- ► These lectures : focus on DLP and factoring

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References and Credits
<ul> <li>Joux, Algorithmic Cryptanalysis, Chapters 3,7,14,15</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>Joux-Odlyzko-Pierrot, The past, evolving present and future of discrete logarithms</li> </ul>

Nice DLP algorithm picture is taken from there

Factoring algorithms

Generic DLP algorithms

Index Calculus for DLP : introduction

Subexponential DLP algorithms

Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm

Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

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Outline	Generic attacks
Generic DLP algorithms	
Index Calculus for DLP : introduction	<ul> <li>DLP is trivial in some groups</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>DLP seems harder in other groups</li> </ul>
Subexponential DLP algorithms	<ul> <li>Best attacks in a particular group often rely on</li> </ul>
Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm	specific properties of the group
Quasi-polynomial DEP algorithm	Can we find better groups?
Factoring algorithms	How hard can DLP be in the best (hardest) groups?
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem	
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# Group isomorphisms

 Any cyclic group (G, ∘) of order n can be seen as (Z<sub>n</sub>, +) in the following sense : there exists an invertible map φ : G → Z<sub>n</sub> such that ∀x, y ∈ G, we have

$$\varphi(x \circ y) = \varphi(x) + \varphi(y)$$

- $\blacktriangleright$  Remark  $\varphi$  does not need to be efficiently computable
- Example : let g of order p − 1 in Z<sup>\*</sup><sub>p</sub>. Can define φ as sending any h ∈ G to φ(h) ∈ Z<sub>p−1</sub> such that h = g<sup>φ(h)</sup>.
- Let  $x' = \varphi(x)$  and  $y' = \varphi(y)$ . We have

$$\varphi^{-1}(x'+y') = \varphi^{-1}(\varphi(x)+\varphi(y)) = \varphi^{-1}(\varphi(x\circ y)) = x\circ y = \varphi^{-1}(x')\circ\varphi^{-1}(y')$$

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# DLP in the generic group model

- A DLP instance is generated in (Z<sub>n</sub>, +), including a generator g ∈ Z<sub>n</sub> and another element h = kg ∈ Z<sub>n</sub>
- A random invertible map  $\theta : \mathbb{Z}_n \to \mathbb{Z}_n$  is chosen
- The map defines a group  $(\mathbb{Z}_n, \circ)$  with

$$x \circ y = \theta \left( \theta^{-1}(x) + \theta^{-1}(y) \right)$$

- The attacker is NOT given g, h nor  $\theta$
- The attacker is given θ(g), θ(h) and access to oracles
   O<sub>1</sub> : on input x, y, return θ (θ<sup>-1</sup>(x) + θ<sup>-1</sup>(y))
  - $\mathcal{O}_2$  : on input x, return  $\theta(-\theta^{-1}(x))$
- The attacker's goal is to compute k

# Generic group model

- As  $\theta$  is random, there is no special property of the group that can be exploited
- ► *n* itself is often hidden, and the attacker just receives bitstrings instead of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  elements (the size of *n* cannot be hidden)
- ► Some attacks are generic : they work for any group This includes exhaustive search, BSGS, Pollard's rho
- There exist much better attacks for finite fields
- Still no better attack for (well-chosen) elliptic curves

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#### Exhaustive search

- Given  $g, h \in G$  do the following
  - 1:  $k \leftarrow 1$ ;  $h' \leftarrow g$ 2: if h' = h then 3: return k
  - 4: else

5: 
$$k \leftarrow k+1; h' \leftarrow h'g$$

- Generic algorithm
- Time complexity |G| in the worst case, |G|/2 on average
- Can we do better?

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# Baby step, giant step (BSGS)

• Let  $h = g^k$ . You want to compute k.

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- Let  $N' = \lceil \sqrt{|G|} \rceil$
- There exist  $0 \le i, j < N'$  such that k = jN' + i

$$h = g^{jN'+i} \Leftrightarrow hg^{-jN'} = g^i$$

- Compute  $L_B := \{g^i | i = 0, ..., N' 1\}$
- Compute  $L_{\mathcal{G}} := \{hg^{-jN'}| j = 0, \dots, N' 1\}$
- Attack requires time and memory  $O(\sqrt{|G|})$

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- Suppose there are  $N_2$  people in a room. What is the probability that two people have the same birthday?
- How many people needed to have a probability larger than 50%?
- Answer is 23 :

$$\mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{all \ distinct}] = 1 \cdot \frac{364}{365} \cdot \frac{363}{365} \cdot \ldots \cdot \frac{365 - 22}{365} < \frac{1}{2}$$

#### Birthday paradox

- ► Suppose you choose N<sub>2</sub> elements randomly in a set of N elements. What is the probability that two elements are equal ?
- ▶ How should  $N_2$  be wrt N to have a probability larger than 50%?
- Answer is  $O(\sqrt{N})$  :

 $\begin{aligned} \mathsf{Pr}[\mathsf{all distinct}] &= 1 \cdot \frac{N-1}{N} \cdot \frac{N-2}{N} \cdot \ldots \cdot \frac{N-N_2+1}{N} \\ &\approx e^{-\frac{1}{N} \cdot e^{-\frac{2}{N}} \cdot \ldots \cdot e^{-\frac{N_2-1}{N}}} \\ &\approx e^{-\frac{N_2(N_2-1)}{N}} \end{aligned}$ 

Taking 
$$N_2 \approx \sqrt{N}$$
 ensures  $1 - \Pr[\text{all distinct}]$  constant

## Pollard's rho (iterative function)

• Define 
$$G_1, G_2, G_3$$
 of about the same size such that  
 $G = G_1 \cup G_2 \cup G_3$  and  $G_i \cap G_j = \{\}$   
• Over  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , can choose  
 $G_1 = \{0, \dots, \lfloor p/3 \rfloor\},\$   
 $G_2 = \{\lfloor p/3 \rfloor + 1, \dots, \lfloor 2p/3 \rfloor\},\$   
 $G_3 = \{\lfloor 2p/3 \rfloor + 1, \dots, p-2\}$   
• Define a function  $f : G \to G$  such that  
 $\begin{cases} f(z) = zg \quad z \in G_1 \\ f(z) = z^2 \quad z \in G_2 \\ f(z) = zh \quad z \in G_3 \end{cases}$   
(original definition, other definitions possible)

# Pollard's rho (intuition)

- Start from g<sub>0</sub> := g and apply f recursively to get g<sub>i</sub>
- ▶ By the way f is defined, we can keep track of a<sub>i</sub>, b<sub>i</sub> such that g<sub>i</sub> = g<sup>a<sub>i</sub></sup>h<sup>b<sub>i</sub></sup>
- If f is "random enough", obtain random elements in G and a collision after O(√|G|) elements
- Collision gives DLP solution

Pollard's rho (simplest version)

1:  $N \leftarrow \lceil \sqrt{|G|} \rceil$ 2:  $a \leftarrow 1; b \leftarrow 0; \tilde{h} \leftarrow g; L \leftarrow \{(a, b, \tilde{h})\}$ 3: for  $k \in \{2, ..., N\}$  do 4: if  $\tilde{h} \in G_1$  then  $a \leftarrow a + 1; \tilde{h} \leftarrow \tilde{h}g$ 5: if  $\tilde{h} \in G_2$  then  $a \leftarrow 2a; b \leftarrow 2b; \tilde{h} \leftarrow (\tilde{h})^2$ 6: if  $\tilde{h} \in G_3$  then  $b \leftarrow b + 1; \tilde{h} \leftarrow \tilde{h}h$ 7:  $L \leftarrow L \cup \{(a, b, \tilde{h})\}$ 8: end for 9: Find distinct  $(a_i, b_i, \tilde{h}) \in L, i = 1, 2$ 10: if no such elements then abort 11: return  $-(a_1 - a_2)/(b_1 - b_2) \mod |G|$ 

#### Pollard's rho analysis

- Correctness :
  - Every  $(a, b, \tilde{h})$  in the list satisfies  $\tilde{h} = g^a h^b$
  - $g^{a_1}h^{b_1} = g^{a_2}h^{b_2}$  implies  $h = g^{-\frac{a_1-a_2}{b_1-b_2}}$
- Time and memory costs  $N \approx \sqrt{|G|}$
- Good probability of success by birthday's paradox

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# Pollard's rho (improvement)

- ► Let (L<sub>1</sub>, L<sub>1</sub> + L<sub>2</sub>) be the indices of first collision
- Then  $(L_1 + j, L_1 + kL_2 + j)$  also collide
- For j, k such that  $L_1 + j = kL_2$ , we have  $L_1 + kL_2 + j = 2(L_1 + j)$
- Now search for  $(a_i, b_i, \tilde{h}_i)$  and  $(a_{2i}, b_{2i}, \tilde{h}_{2i})$  such that  $\tilde{h}_i = \tilde{h}_{2i}$
- Only requires constant size memory

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#### Pohlig-Hellman

- Assume  $|G| = n_1 n_2$  and let g a generator of G
- $h = g^k$  implies  $h^{n_1} = (g^{n_1})^k$
- where  $g^{n_1}$  generates a subgroup of order  $n_2$
- Solving DLP in that subgroup gives  $k \mod n_2$
- Repeating for each factor and using CRT gives k

# Pohlig-Hellman (example)

- Let  $G = \mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$ , let g = 2 and let h = 7
- We have  $|G| = 12 = 2^2 \cdot 3$
- ► Recover k mod 2 by solving  $(2^6)^k = 7^6 \mod 13 \Leftrightarrow (-1)^k = -1 \mod 13 \Leftrightarrow k = 1 \mod 2$
- Write k = 1 + 2k'. Recover  $k \mod 4$  by solving  $(2^3)^{1+2k'} = 7^3 \mod 13 \Leftrightarrow (-1)^{k'} = -1 \mod 13$  $\Leftrightarrow k' = 1 \mod 2 \Leftrightarrow k = 3 \mod 4$
- Recover k mod 3 by solving  $(2^4)^k = 7^4 \mod 13 \Leftrightarrow (3)^k = 9 \mod 13 \Leftrightarrow k = 2 \mod 3$
- Use CRT to deduce  $k = 11 \mod 12$

Outline	Outline
Generic DLP algorithms	Generic DLP algorithms
Index Calculus for DLP : introduction Overview Example : Adleman's algorithm The linear algebra part	Index Calculus for DLP : introduction Overview Example : Adleman's algorithm The linear algebra part
Subexponential DLP algorithms	Subexponential DLP algorithms
Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm	Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm
Factoring algorithms	Factoring algorithms
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem	Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
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# Discrete Logarithms over finite fields

- ► Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) Given G a finite cyclic group, given g a generator of G, and given h ∈ G, find k such that h = g<sup>k</sup>
- Believed to be a hard problem when *G* is the multiplicative group of a well-chosen field
- ► (Formal definition of "hard" involves families of fields,...)

# Fields used in cryptography

- $\mathbb{F}_p^*$  where p is prime : most used, believed to be secure
- $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}^*$  where p is prime and n is small (typically up to 12) : used in *pairing* applications
- $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$  or  $\mathbb{F}_{3^n}^*$  where *n* is a product of small primes : should be avoided (Pohlig-Hellman attack)
- ▶ ℝ<sup>\*</sup><sub>2<sup>n</sup></sub> or ℝ<sup>\*</sup><sub>3<sup>n</sup></sub> for arbitrary n : should now also be avoided, suggested before 2013 for efficiency reasons
- ▶ Remark : typically work over a prime order subgroup of F<sup>\*</sup><sub>p</sub> or F<sup>\*</sup><sub>p</sub>, otherwise problems such as *decisional Diffie-Helman* are easy

# L notation

$$L_Q(\alpha; c) = \exp(c(\log Q)^{\alpha}(\log \log Q)^{1-\alpha})$$

- Q is the size of the field
- $\alpha = 0 \Rightarrow L_Q(\alpha; c) = (\log Q)^c$  polynomial
- $\alpha = 1 \Rightarrow L_Q(\alpha; c) = Q^c$  exponential

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# Playing with L notation

 $L_Q(\alpha; c) = \exp(c(\log Q)^{\alpha} (\log \log Q)^{1-\alpha})$ 

- Approximation : ignore constant and log log factors, write  $L_Q(\alpha)$  (but beware they are very relevant in practice!)
- $L_Q(\alpha)L_Q(\beta) \approx L_Q(\max(\alpha,\beta))$
- $L_Q(\alpha, c)^k = L_Q(\alpha, kc)$  if k is constant
- $L_Q(\alpha, c)^k = L_Q(\alpha + \beta, c)$  if  $k = (\log Q)^{\beta}$

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# State-of-the-art and History

- Write  $Q = q^n$  (with q a prime power)
- State-of-the-art depends on relative size of q and n
- ► See Joux, Odlyzko, Pierrot. The past, evolving present and future of discrete logarithms www-polsys.lip6.fr/~pierrot/papers/Dlog.pdf

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DLP algorithms for finite fields

#### Index calculus

- Generic framework to solve discrete logarithm problems, but some steps are group-specific
- Let g, h a DLP problem
- Define a factor basis *F* ⊂ *G*, ensuring *F* contains a generator (most elements in *G* are generators)
- Can assume  $g \in \mathcal{F}$ , otherwise do the following :
  - Pick a generator  $g' \in \mathcal{F}$
  - Compute *a* such that  $g = (g')^a$
  - Compute *b* such that  $h = (g')^b$
  - Compute  $k = b/a \mod |G|$
- Remark : size of  $\mathcal{F}$  will be optimized for efficiency

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#### Index calculus

 $\blacktriangleright$  Find about  $|\mathcal{F}|$  relations between factor basis elements

$$\mathcal{R}_j: \prod_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}} f_i^{a_{i,j}} = 1$$

(the algorithm to compute the relations is group-specific)

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► Deduce  

$$\sum_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}} a_{i,j} \log_g f_i = 0$$
or
$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{1,1} & \dots & a_{|\mathcal{F}|,1} \\ \vdots & & \vdots \\ a_{1,|\mathcal{F}|} & \dots & a_{|\mathcal{F}|,|\mathcal{F}|} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} \log_g f_1 \\ \vdots \\ \log_g f_{|\mathcal{F}|} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

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Outline

#### Index calculus

- ► Use linear algebra to compute all log<sub>g</sub> f<sub>i</sub>, the discrete logarithms of factor basis elements
- Deduce the discrete logarithm of h (This part is group-specific and may involve several steps)
- ► Remarks :
  - Relations often involve few elements, hence linear algebra is sparse
  - In some cases, h is included in the factor basis and the last step is avoided : linear algebra produces log<sub>g</sub> h

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#### Generic DLP algorithms

#### Index Calculus for $\mathsf{DLP}$ : introduction

Example : Adleman's algorithm

The linear algebra part

Subexponential DLP algorithms

Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm

Factoring algorithms

Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

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# Leonard Adleman



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# Example : a naive index calculus for $\mathbb{F}_p^*$

- DLP : given  $g, h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ , find k such that  $h = g^k$
- Factor basis made of small primes

$$\mathcal{F}_B := \{ \text{primes } p_i \leq B \}$$

# ► Relation search

1

- Compute  $r_j := g^{a_j} h^{b_j}$  for random  $a_j, b_j \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
- ▶ If all factors of  $r_j$  are  $\leq B$ , we have a relation

$$g^{a_j}h^{b_j}=\prod_{p_i\in\mathcal{F}}p_i^{e_i}$$

• Linear algebra produces  $g^a h^b = 1$ 

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Size of the factor basis

► By the prime number theorem,

$$|\{\text{primes } p_i \leq B\}| \approx \frac{B}{\ln B}$$

Smooth numbers

- An integer number is *B*-smooth if all its prime factors are smaller than *B*
- Define  $\Psi(N, B) = \#\{B \text{-smooth numbers} \le N\}$
- Let  $u = \log N / \log B$ . We have

$$\frac{\Psi(N,B)}{N} = \rho(u) + O\left(\frac{1}{\log B}\right)$$

• Here  $\rho$  is the *Dickman-de Bruijn* function with


$$\rho(u) \approx u^{-u}$$

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# Dickman-de Bruijn function $\rho$



# Naive analysis of naive index calculus

- Choose log  $B \approx (\log p)^{1/2}$
- $|\mathcal{F}| \approx B/\log B \approx 2^{(\log p)^{1/2} (\log \log p)^{-1/2}} \approx 2^{(\log p)^{1/2}}$

- $u = \log p / \log B \approx (\log p)^{1/2}$   $\rho(u) = (\log p)^{-1/2(\log p)^{1/2}} \approx 2^{-1/2(\log p)^{1/2}(\log \log p)}$
- Number of random trials to get  $|\mathcal{F}|$  relations is

 $pprox |\mathcal{F}| 
ho(u)^{-1} pprox 2^{(1/2+o(1))(\log p)^{1/2}(\log \log p)}$ 

- Each trial has polytime complexity in log p
- Linear algebra cost is  $|\mathcal{F}|^\omega pprox 2^{\omega(\log p)^{1/2}}$
- Total cost dominated by relation search
- $B \approx L_p(1/2; c)$  leads to slighly better cost  $L_p(1/2; c')$

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Playing with L notation (2)

- $L_Q(\alpha; c) = \exp(c(\log Q)^{\alpha}(\log \log Q)^{1-\alpha})$
- Probability that an element of size  $L(\alpha)$  is  $L(\beta)$  smooth is

$$(L(\alpha - \beta))^{-1}$$

▶ If c is constant, the probability that an element of size B is B/c-smooth is constant

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Same algorithm for  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$ 

- DLP : given  $g, h \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$ , find k such that  $h = g^k$
- ► Factor basis made of small "primes"

$$\mathcal{F}_B := \{ \text{irreducible } f(X) \in \mathbb{F}_2[X] | \deg(f) \leq B \}$$

- Relation search
  - Compute  $r_i := g^{a_j} h^{b_j}$  for random  $a_i, b_i \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
  - ▶ Factor  $r_i \in \mathbb{F}_2[X]$  with Berlekamp's algorithm
  - If all factors  $\in \mathcal{F}_B$ , we have a relation  $g^a h^b = \prod_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}} f_i^{e_i}$
- Linear algebra produces  $g^a h^b = 1$

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Outline	Linear algebra
Generic DLP algorithms	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Index Calculus for DLP : introduction Overview Example : Adleman's algorithm The linear algebra part	• Given matrix <i>M</i> and vector <i>x</i> , find all <i>y</i> such that $My = x$
Subexponential DLP algorithms	
Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm	
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# Gaussian elimination

- Observation : if My = x then for any invertible N, we have NMy = Nx
- In particular, this is true when N is a matrix which
  - ► Swaps two rows of *M*
  - Multiplies one row by an invertible constant
  - Adds a multiple of one row of M to another row of M
- Gaussian elimination repeats these operations until the resulting matrix is upper triangular

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Gaussian elimination

- Algorithm when *M* is invertible
  - 1: for each column *i*, from i = 1 to *n* do
  - 2: Find a nonzero element in this column
  - 3: Swap the row of this element with row i
  - 4: **for** each row *j* below row *i* **do** 
    - Let  $c := -M_{j,i}/M_{i,i}$
  - 6: Add c times row i to row j
    - to erase the value in (j, i)
  - 7: end for
  - 8: end for

5:

- Adapt step 2 otherwise
- Cost is  $O(n^3)$  multiplications
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# Resolution from Gaussian form

- Algorithm when *M* is invertible
  - 1: **for** each column *i* from *n* to 1 **do**
  - Recover value of unknown *i*, using equation *i* and all values of previously computed unknowns *j* > *i* end for
- ► Adapt to determine the afine space of solutions v + ker M otherwise
- ▶ Cost is O(n<sup>2</sup>) multiplications
- Can be used to invert M in  $O(n^3)$  multiplications

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# Sparse linear algebra

- A matrix is sparse if each row contains a small number of nonzero elements
- ► Can store larger size matrices by storing only (i, j, M<sub>i,j</sub>) for nonzero elements M<sub>i,j</sub>
- Gaussian elimination will kill the sparsity quickly
- Two approaches for sparse matrices :
  - Structured Gaussian elimination
  - Algorithms based on matrix-vector multiplications

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# Structured Gaussian elimination

- Consider the linear system My = x
- For the matrices *M* occurring in index calculus :
  - Each row contains few elements
  - The first columns contain much more elements than the last ones
- Structured Gaussian elimination involves several tricks such as removing variables that only appear once or twice
- Used as preprocessing to reduce the size in practice
- Heuristic

# Lanczos algorithm

- If M is invertible, My = x ⇔ M<sup>t</sup>My = M<sup>t</sup>x hence we can assume M is symmetric positive definite defining a scalar product (x, y)<sub>M</sub> := xMy<sup>t</sup>
- Lanczos is iterative : over the real/complex numbers, the algorithm can be stopped before the end with a reasonable approximation of the solution
- First compute a basis {v<sub>i</sub>} of orthogonal vectors with respect to the scalar product (\*,\*)<sub>M</sub>,
- Then compute  $\sum_{i=1}^{n} (x, v_i) v_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (y, v_i)_M v_i = y$
- Second part involves O(n) matrix-vector multiplications, each one at O(n) cost if each row contains O(1) elements

## Computing the orthogonal basis

- Start from a random  $w_1$  and  $v_1 = w_1/||w_1||_M$
- Then heuristic modification of Gram-Schmidt algorithm


  - 1.  $w_{i+1} = Mv_i$ 2.  $w'_{i+1} = w_{i+1} \sum_{j=1}^{i} (w_{i+1}, v_j)_M \cdot v_j$ 3.  $v_{i+1} = w'_{i+1} / ||w'_{i+1}||_M$
- Second step is in fact

 $w'_{i+1} = w_{i+1} - (w_{i+1}, v_i)_M \cdot v_i - (w_{i+1}, v_{i-1})_M \cdot v_{i-1}$ 

• Likely to converge to a basis  $\{v_1, \ldots, v_n\}$  over the reals; needs some adjustment for small characteristic finite fields

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#### Cornelius Lanczos



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#### Wiedemann algorithm

- Reconstruct the **minimal polynomial** of M: smallest degree polynomial f such that f(M) = 0
- If  $f(\alpha) = \sum_{i=0}^{d} f_i \alpha^i$ , then  $I = -\frac{1}{f_0} \sum_{i=1}^{d} f_i M^i$  then

$$x = -\frac{1}{f_0} \sum_{i=1}^d f_i M^i x = M \left( -\frac{1}{f_0} \sum_{i=1}^d f_i M^{i-1} x \right)$$

• We deduce y such that My = x

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Wiedemann algorithm (2)

- Main idea to compute minimal polynomial :
  - Construct  $(a, M^i x)$  for a random vector a and  $i=0,\ldots,2n-1$
  - Use Berlekamp-Massey's algorithm to compute the linear recurrence in this sequence
- The whole algorithm requires O(n) matrix-vector products
- ► Recent discrete log records use Block Wiedemann http://caramel.loria.fr/p180.txt


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# Outline



# Further subexponential DLP algorithms



Source:www-polsys.lip6.fr/~pierrot/papers/Dlog.pdf

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Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm

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# Don Coppersmith



#### Remember : basic algorithm for $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$

- ▶ DLP : given  $g, h \in \mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*$ , find k such that  $h = g^k$
- Factor basis made of small "primes"

 $\mathcal{F}_B := \{ \text{irreducible } f(X) \in \mathbb{F}_2[X] \mid \deg(f) \leq B \}$ 

- Relation search ►
  - Compute  $r_j := g^{a_j} h^{b_j}$  for random  $a_j, b_j \in \{1, \dots, p-1\}$
  - Factor  $r_j \in \mathbb{F}_2[X]$  with Berlekamp's algorithm
  - If all factors  $\in \mathcal{F}_B$ , we have a relation  $g^a h^b = \prod_{f_i \in \mathcal{F}} f_i^{e_i}$
- Linear algebra produces  $g^a h^b = 1$

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#### Coppersmith's algorithm for $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$

- Idea : reduce factor basis to polynomials of degree  $n^{1/3}$ (vs.  $n^{1/2}$ ) by ensuring all  $r_i$  have degree  $n^{2/3}$  (vs. n)
- We have  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n} \approx \mathbb{F}_2[x]/(p(x))$  for any irreducible pChoose  $p(x) = x^n + q(x)$  where deg  $q \le n^{2/3}$
- Let  $k = 2^e \approx n^{1/3}$ , let  $d \approx n^{1/3}$
- Let  $h \approx n^{2/3}$  least integer larger than n/k
- Let  $r(x) = x^{hk} \mod p(x) = q(x)x^{hk-n}$ with deg  $r < k + \deg q \approx n^{2/3}$

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# Coppersmith's algorithm for $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$

- ▶ Factor basis are elements with degree smaller than *d*, where *d* smallest integer  $\geq n^{1/3}$
- Relations will be of the form  $d(x) = (c(x))^k$ for c, d smooth, where c constructed in a special way
- Relation search
  - Take a(x) and b(x) coprime with degrees d
  - Take  $c(x) = a(x)x^h + b(x)$  degree  $O(n^{2/3})$
  - Take  $d(x) = (c(x))^k \mod p$
  - We have  $d(x) = r(x)(a(x))^k + (b(x))^k$  degree  $O(n^{2/3})$
  - If both c and d are smooth, we get a relation
     Probability O(2<sup>-n<sup>1/3</sup>-ϵ</sup>)


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# Individual logarithms

- For increasing *i*, until  $m_i$  and  $n_i$  are smooth enough
  - Use continued fractions/ Euclide algorithm to write  $h(x)x^i = m_i(x)/n_i(x)$  with deg  $m_i$ , deg  $n_i \leq n/2$
  - ▶ Check smoothness of *m<sub>i</sub>* and *n<sub>i</sub>*
  - ► Continue until both are O(n<sup>2/3</sup>) smooth
- ▶ For each factor *m* 
  - Choose a(x) and b(x) coprime random such that m|c where  $c(x) = a(x)x^h + b(x)$
  - Let  $d(x) = (c(x))^k \mod p(x)$  as above
  - If d and c/m are smooth enough, we either iterate on all (smaller degree) factors or we write m in the factor basis

# Outline

Function	Field	Sieves
i anotion	1 1010	0.0100



# Adleman-Huang

- We want to solve DLP in  $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$ , where p is constant
- Set smoothness bound  $d \approx n^{1/3}$
- Define  $f(x) = x^n + q(x)$  where deg  $q < n^{2/3}$
- Let  $k \approx n^{1/3}$ , let h least integer larger than n/k, and let  $\delta = hk n$
- Let  $m(x) = x^h$  and  $H(x, y) = y^k + x^{\delta}q(x)$
- We have a homomorphism

$$\Phi: \frac{\mathbb{F}_{\rho}[x,y]}{(H(x,y))} \to \frac{\mathbb{F}_{\rho}[x]}{(f(x))}: (x,y) \to (x,m(x))$$

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Factor basis and relations

- $\blacktriangleright$  Factor basis is  $\mathcal{F}=\mathcal{F}_1\cup\mathcal{F}_2$  where
  - 1.  $\mathcal{F}_1$  contains all irreducible polynomials of degree at most d over  $\mathbb{F}_{\rho}$ ,
  - 2.  $\mathcal{F}_2 = \{r + ms \mid N(r + ys) \in \mathcal{F}_1\}$ (Here  $N(r + ys) = r^k H(x, -s/r)$  is function field norm)
- ► To find a relation, take random couples of polynomials (a, b) both of degrees about n<sup>1/3</sup>, until both
  - 1. am + b is d-smooth
  - 2. N(ay + b) is d-smooth

# Adleman-Huang (2)


From each such couple deduce a relation

$$\sum_{P_i \in \mathcal{F}_1} e_i \log P_i = \sum_{Q_i \in \mathcal{F}_2} f_i \log Q_i$$

- Remark : deg(am + b) ≈ deg N(ay + b) ≈ n<sup>2/3</sup> so probability that a random couple (a, b) gives a relation is about L<sub>p</sub>(1/3)<sup>-1</sup>
- Individual logarithms as in Coppersmith's algorithm

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#### Joux-Lercier



Source:www-polsys.lip6.fr/~pierrot/papers/Dlog.pdf

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
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Joux-Lercier

- We want to solve DLP in  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}$ , where  $q = L_{q^n}(1/3)$
- Find polynomials  $g_1, g_2$  of degrees  $d_1, d_2 \approx n^{1/2}$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  s.t.  $g_2(g_1(x)) + x$  has an irreducible factor I of degree n
- Letting  $y = g_1(x)$ , we see that  $g_1(-g_2(y)) y$  has an irreducible factor I' of degree n
- ▶ If  $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{p^n}$  is a root of *I* then  $\beta = g_1(\alpha)$  is a root of *I*'
- If  $\beta \in \mathbb{F}_{p^n}$  is a root of I' then  $\alpha = -g_2(\beta)$  is a root of I

Joux-Lercier

 We have the following commutative diagram of homomorphisms



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# Factor basis and relations

## • Factor basis is $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2$ where

- *F*<sub>1</sub> = images of degree 1 polynomials in *F<sub>q</sub>[y]* by *y* ← β *F*<sub>2</sub> = images of degree 1 polynomials in *F<sub>q</sub>[x]* by *x* ← α
- To find relations, pick random h(x, y) = xy + bx + cy + duntil both  $h(g_2(y), y)$  and  $h(x, g_1(x))$  split completely
- Splitting probability  $\frac{1}{d_1!} \cdot \frac{1}{d_2!} \approx 2^{-n^{1/2}\log n} \approx L_{q^n}(1/3)$
- Size of  $\mathcal{F}$  is also  $L_{q^n}(1/3)$

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### Individual logarithms


- Let  $h \in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$  for which we want to compute DL
- Compute  $x^i h(x)$  until the result is moderately smooth
- For each factor h', find  $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_q[x]$  such that
  - Degrees not too large, about deg h'
  - $h'(x) | (a(x)g_1(x) + b(x))$
  - $(a(x)g_1(x) + b(x)) / h'(x)$  smoother enough
  - $a(g_2(y))y + b(g_2(y))$  smooth enough
- Alternatively decrease the factors on each side, until all factors on both sides are linear

# Outline

Subexponential DLP algorithms

Number Field Sieves

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Number Field Sieves

Source : www-polsys.lip6.fr/~pierrot/papers/Dlog.pdf

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## Gordon

- We want to solve DLP in  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , where p is prime
- Choose  $m \approx L_p(2/3)$
- Let  $p = \sum_{i=0}^{d} f_i m^i$  with  $d \approx (\log p)^{1/3}$

• Let 
$$f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{d} f_i x^i$$

We have a ring homomorphism

$$\varphi : \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f(x)) \to \mathbb{F}_p : x \to m$$

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## Factor basis and relations

- Let  $B \approx L_p(1/3)$  be a smoothness bound
- Factor basis is  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2$  where
  - $\mathcal{F}_1 = \{ \text{primes smaller than } B \}$
  - $\mathcal{F}_2 = \{ \text{degree 1 prime ideals } \nu \mid N(\nu) \in \mathcal{F}_1 \}$
- Search for pairs (a, b) with  $a \approx b \approx L_p(1/3)$  such that  $a + bm \in \mathcal{F}_1$  and  $a + bx \in \mathcal{F}_2$
- Note that  $a + bm \approx N(a + bx) = (-b)^d f(-a/b) \approx L_p(2/3)$ so smoothness probability is  $L_p(1/3)$

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
# Individual logarithms

- Suppose we want DL of a particular h
- First compute  $x^i h$  until the result is  $L_p(2/3)$  smooth
- ▶ For each factor *h<sub>i</sub>*,
  - ▶ Generate  $L_p(1/3)$ -smooth  $\ell_i \approx h_i$ , let  $m_i = h_i \ell_i$ , let  $f_i(x)$  such that  $f_i(m_i) = 0 \mod p$ , until  $N_i(x) = f_i(0)$  is  $L_p(1/3)$  smooth
  - Search for pairs (a, b) with  $a \approx b \approx L_p(1/3)$  such that  $a + bm_i \in \mathcal{F}_1$  and  $N_i(a + bx)$  is  $L_p(1/3)$  smooth. Repeat and eliminate factors not in  $\mathcal{F}_1$

# Technicalities

- $\blacktriangleright$  Need to cancel units appearing in the relations  $\Rightarrow$  add these units to the factor bases
- If the class number of Q[x]/(f(x)) is h > 1 then need to remove non-principal ideals from the relations
   ⇒ implicitly take h powering of the equations to get principal ideals

# Joux-Lercier-Smart-Vercauteren



Source : ww	w-polsys.lip6.fr	/~pierrot/pa	pers/Dlog.pd	f

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# Joux-Lercier-Smart-Vercauteren

- We want to solve DLP in  $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$ , where  $p = L_{p^n}(2/3)$
- Choose  $f_1 \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$  of degree *n* with small coefficients, with a root *m* modulo *p*
- Let  $f_2 = f_1 + p$
- Define number fields  $K_i = \mathbb{Q}[x]/(f_i(x))$
- We have two homomorphisms

$$\varphi_i: K_i \to \mathbb{F}_{p^n}: x \to m$$

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## Factor basis and relations

- Let  $B \approx L_{p^n}(1/3)$  be a smoothness bound
- Let  $\mathcal{F}_0 = \{ \text{primes smaller than } B \}$
- Factor basis is  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2$  where
  - $\mathcal{F}_1 = \{c + dm \mid N_1(c + dx) = (-d)^k f_1(-c/d) \in \mathcal{F}_0\}$
  - $\mathcal{F}_2 = \{c + dm \mid N_2(c + dx) = (-d)^k f_2(-c/d) \in \mathcal{F}_0\}$
- Search for pairs (a, b) with  $a \approx b \approx L_{p^n}(1/3)$  such that both  $N_i(a + bx) \in \mathcal{F}_0$
- Note that N<sub>i</sub>(a + bx) ≈ L<sub>p<sup>n</sup></sub>(2/3) so smoothness probability is L<sub>p</sub>(1/3)


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## Remarks

- $\blacktriangleright$  Individual logarithms as in Gordon, alternating descent in  ${\cal K}_1$  and  ${\cal K}_2$
- If K<sub>i</sub> has a non-trivial automorphism group Aut(K) (for example if it is Galois) then corresponding part of factor basis can be reduced by a factor #Aut(K)
- Multiple number field sieve uses more than 2 number fields in parallel

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# Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm !



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# Barbulescu, Gaudry, Joux, Thomé



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# Sparse medium subfield representation

- ► A finite field K admits a sparse medium subfield representation if
  - $K = \mathbb{F}_{q^{2k}}$  for some prime power q
  - ▶ There exist  $h_0, h_1 \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}[X]$  with small degrees, such that  $X^q h_1(X) h_0(X)$  has a degree k irreducible factor I
- In practice we can find  $h_1, h_2$  of degrees at most 2
- The polynomial I is used to define  $\mathbb{F}_{q^{2k}} = \mathbb{F}_{q^2}[X]/(I(X))$
- Elements in such field will be seen as polynomials of degree less than k over  $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}$

# Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm !

- If K admits a sparse medium subfield representation then (initially under various heuristics, now getting cleaner) any discrete logarithm in K can be computed in time bounded by max(q, k)<sup>O(log k)</sup>
- If  $q \approx k$  then  $q = O(\log |K|)$  hence complexity  $q^{O(\log q)} = 2^{O((\log \log |K|)^2)}$  quasi-polynomial in  $\log |K|$
- If |K| = p<sup>n</sup> with characteristic p = (log |K|)<sup>O(1)</sup> then set q = p<sup>[log<sub>p</sub> n]</sup> and work in extension field L = 𝔽<sub>q<sup>2n</sup></sub>, still quasi-polynomial

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• If  $q = L_{q^{2k}}(\alpha)$  then complexity  $L_{q^{2k}}(\alpha)^{O(\log \log q^{2k})}$ 

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# Key proposition

Let  $K=\mathbb{F}_{q^{2k}}$  with a sparse medium subfield representation. Under various heuristics,

1. There is an algorithm (polynomial time in q and k) which given an element of K as a polynomial  $P \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}[X]$  with  $2 \leq \deg P \leq k - 1$ , returns an expression with at most  $O(q^2k)$  terms

$$\log P = e_0 \log h_1 + \sum e_i \log P_i$$

where deg  $P_i \leq \lceil \frac{1}{2} \deg P \rceil$  and  $e_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ 

2. There is an algorithm (polynomial time in q and k) which returns log  $h_1$  and log(X + a) for all  $a \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}$ 

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#### Using the Key proposition

• Given  $P \in K$  we use first part to obtain

$$\log P = e_0 \log h_1 + \sum e_i \log P_i$$

where deg  $P_i \leq \lceil \frac{1}{2} \deg P \rceil$ 

- ► Apply first part recursively on each *P<sub>i</sub>*
- Eventually

$$\log P = e_0 \log h_1 + \sum_{a \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}} e_a \log(X + a)$$

► Apply second part to get log P

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- Using the Key proposition (2)
- ► The procedure constructs a tree with arity O(q<sup>2</sup>k) and O(log k) levels
- Number of nodes is  $(q^2k)^{O(\log k)}$
- Each node has a cost polynomial in k and q

## Main ideas in Key proposition

Systematic equation

$$X^q - X = \prod_{\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q} (X - \alpha)$$

Sparse field representation

$$I|(h_1X^q - h_0) \Rightarrow X^q = \frac{h_0}{h_1} \mod I$$

• Replace X by  $m \cdot P$  in systematic equation, where

$$m \cdot P = rac{aP+b}{cP+d}$$
 and  $m = \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} \in SL(2, \mathbb{F}_{q^2})$ 

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## Sketch of the algorithm

- Given *P*, substitute *X* by  $m \cdot P$  for various *m*, so that products  $P(X) \alpha$  appear on the RHS
- Use the sparse field representation to reduce the degree on the LHS to about the degree of P
- Keep the relation if all factors of the LHS have degree smaller than [<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> deg P]
- Combine the relations with linear algebra to eliminate all factors P(X) − β with β ≠ 0
- For second part : take P(X) = X

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# Remarks

- Relations obtained are identical for all m = λm' with λ ∈ F<sub>q<sup>2</sup></sub> and m ∈ SL(2, F<sub>q</sub>), and more generally we pick m in distinct cosets of PGL(F<sub>q<sup>2</sup></sub>)/PGL(F<sub>q</sub>)
- Probability that a random polynomial of degree D is D/2-smooth is constant
- Analysis involves several heuristic assumptions; they are likely to be fine, if not then we are likely to refine them and deduce a better algorithm

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Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

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# Integer factorization

• Given a composite number *n*, compute its (unique)

• Equivalently : compute one non-trivial factor  $p_i$ 

• We will assume n = pq, where p and q are primes

factorization  $n = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  where  $p_i$  are prime numbers

# Factorization vs Discrete logarithms

- Discrete logarithm and factoring algorithms are similar Exceptions (?)

  - Quasi-polynomial time algorithm for discrete logarithms in small to medium characteristic
  - Elliptic curve factorization method
- Hardness of large characteristic field discrete logarithms and integer factorization is comparable today

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Outline

Factoring algorithms

Basic Algorithms and Quadratic Field Sieve

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Sieve of Eratosthenes

- Compute all primes up to  $\sqrt{n}$ using a sieve
- Try to factor n by each of them •
- Complexity  $O(\sqrt{n})$
- Remark : sieve can also be used to quickly find all smooth numbers in an interval

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# Pollard's rho

- Idea : find x and y such that gcd(x − y, n) = p in other words x = y mod p but x ≠ y mod n
- ► Define some "pseudorandom" iteration function f
- Compute iterates x<sub>i</sub> and x<sub>2i</sub>
- Simultaneously compute  $gcd(x_i x_{2i}, n)$
- By birthday's paradox,  $x_i = x_{2i} \mod p$  after  $O(p^{1/2})$  trials on average, and  $x_i = x_{2i} \mod n$  after  $O(n^{1/2})$  trials on average
- Hence we succeed after  $O(p^{1/2})$  trials on average

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## Pollard's p-1 method

- A number  $x = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  is *B*-powersmooth if  $p_i^{e_i} < B$
- The method assumes p-1 is *B*-powersmooth
- Let *s* be the product of all  $p_i^{e_i} < B$
- By assumption (p-1)|s, hence  $g^s = 1 \mod p$
- We deduce  $gcd(g^s 1, n) = p$
- Only works if some factor p such that p-1 smooth !
- Compute gcd with square-and-multiply algorithm

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#### **Carl Pomerance**



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# Quadratic Field Sieve : Rough version

- A congruence x<sup>2</sup> = y<sup>2</sup> mod n such that x ≠ ±y mod n implies that gcd(x - y, n) is a non trivial factor of n
- Set a smoothness bound  $B \approx L_n(1/2)$
- Factor basis  $\mathcal{F} = \{ \text{primes smaller than } B \}$
- Pick random x<sub>i</sub> until you find a relation

$$x_i^2 \mod n = \prod_{s_j \in \mathcal{F}} s_j^{e_{ij}}$$

(probability is about 
$$L_n(1/2)^{-1}$$
)

• Repeat until you have  $|\mathcal{F}|$  relations

# Quadratic Field Sieve : Rough version (2)

- For each *i* write the exponents  $e_{ij}$  in a row vector
- Perform linear algebra modulo 2 on these vectors to find  $a_i$  such that  $\sum_{i=1}^n e_{ij}a_i = 2b_j$  even
- Deduce a congruence

$$\left(\prod_{i} x_{i}^{a_{i}}\right)^{2} = \prod_{i} \left(x_{i}^{2}\right)^{a_{i}} = \prod_{i} \left(\prod_{s_{j} \in \mathcal{F}} s_{j}^{e_{ij}}\right)^{a_{i}} = \left(\prod_{s_{j} \in \mathcal{F}} s_{j}^{b_{j}}\right)^{2}$$

► Only 2 congruences needed on average

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#### Improvements

• Choose x slightly bigger than  $\sqrt{n}$  such that

$$x^2 \mod n = x^2 - n = (\sqrt{n} + t)^2 - n = 2t\sqrt{n} + t^2$$

is about the size of  $\sqrt{n}$ 

➤ Sieving : instead of testing smoothness with trial divisions, build a basis of smooth numbers of the form x<sup>2</sup> − n by extending the sieve of Erathostenes

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# (General) Number Field Sieve

- Original idea by Pollard, later developed by many authors
- Eventually led to discrete logarithm algorithms as well
- Let  $d \approx (\log n)^{1/3}$  and  $m \approx \lceil n^{1/d} \rceil$
- Write  $n = \sum_{i=0}^{d} f_i m^i$
- Let  $f(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{d} f_i x^i$
- ► We have a ring homomorphism

$$\varphi : \frac{\mathbb{Q}(x)}{(f(x))} \to \mathbb{Z}_n : x \to m$$

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#### Factor basis and relations : rough idea

- Define smoothness bound  $B \approx L_n(1/3)$
- Define factor basis  $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2$  where
  - $\mathcal{F}_1 = \text{set of primes smaller than } B$
  - ►  $\mathcal{F}_2 = \{a + bm \mid a, b \in \mathbb{Z}, N(a + bx) \in \mathcal{F}_1\}$
- (here  $N(a + bx) = (b)^d f(a/b)$  is the number field norm) • Generate pairs (a, b) with  $a, b \approx L_n(1/3)$  until both a + bm and N(a + bx) are B-smooth
- Deduce a relation from each such pair
- Use linear algebra to get x, y such that  $x^2 = y^2 \mod n$
- Complexity  $\approx L_n(1/3)$

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#### **Technicalities**

- As such the number field side of equation may not be a square after linear algebra : only its norm is a square
- $\mathbb{Z}[x]$  may not be the full ring of integers
- Need to deal with units
- Need to deal with non-unique factorization / ideal class group when class number h > 1
- All issues solved by Adleman :
  - Fix a random set of  $O(\log n)$  primes  $q_i$
  - Consider multiplicative characters extending Legendre symbols χ<sub>qi</sub>(ax + b) = (<sup>am+b</sup><sub>qi</sub>)
     Include (χ<sub>qi</sub>(ax + b))<sub>i</sub> in each exponent relation

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#### Remarks

- ► Instead of generating *a*, *b* randomly, fix random *a* values and sieve on b for each fixed a
- Initially various heuristics, but now rigorous bound for complexity of finding  $x^2 = y^2 \mod n$ (yet we cannot prove  $x \neq \pm y \mod n$  !)
- Exact constant more efficient for Mersenne-like numbers (Special Number Field Sieve) than arbitrary numbers (General Number Field Sieve)
- Improved constant using several number fields in parallel (Coppersmith's trick)

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- ▶ Pomerance, A Tale of Two Sieves
- Buhler, Lenstra, Pomerance, Factoring integers with the Number Field Sieve

Further readings

# Outline

Generic DLP algorithms

Index Calculus for DLP : introduction

Subexponential DLP algorithms

Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm

#### Factoring algorithms

Basic Algorithms and Quadratic Field Sieve (General) Number Field Sieve Elliptic Curve Factorization Method

Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem

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# Pollard's p-1 method

- A number  $x = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  is *B*-powersmooth if  $p_i^{e_i} < B$
- $\blacktriangleright$  The method assumes p-1 is *B*-powersmooth
- Let s be the product of all  $p_i^{e_i} < B$
- By assumption (p-1)|s, hence  $g^s = 1 \mod p$
- We deduce  $gcd(g^s 1, n) = p$
- Only works if some factor p such that p-1 smooth !

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# Elliptic curve factorization method





- ► Idea : generalize previous method when neither p − 1 nor q − 1 are smooth
- The group order  $#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$  of an elliptic curve can be smooth even when p-1 is not !

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# Elliptic curve addition law

- Let  $E: y^2 = x^3 + a_4 x + a_6$
- Let  $P_1 = (x_1, y_1)$ ,  $P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$  two points on the curve
- ► The chord-and-tangent rules lead to addition law formulae : for example we have P<sub>1</sub> + P<sub>2</sub> = (x<sub>3</sub>, y<sub>3</sub>) where
- $\begin{aligned} \lambda &= \frac{y_2 y_1}{x_2 x_1}, \quad \nu = \frac{y_1 x_2 y_2 x_1}{x_2 x_1}, \\ x_3 &= \lambda^2 x_1 x_2, \quad y_3 = -\lambda x_3 \nu \end{aligned}$
- $x_3 = \lambda^2 x_1 x_2,$   $y_3 = -\lambda x_3 \nu$ • These formulae involve divisions
- Over  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , a division by 0 means  $P_3$  is point at infinity
- Over  $\mathbb{Z}_n$ , a division fails if  $(x_2 x_1)$  is not invertible
- A failure reveals a factor of n!

## Elliptic curve factorization method

- 1. Choose *E* and  $P = (x, y) \in E(\mathbb{Z}_n)$
- 2. Let B be a smoothness bound on  $\#E(\mathbb{Z}_p)$  for p|n
- 3. Compute  $s = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  where  $p_i^{e_i} \leq B$
- 4. We have [s]P = 0 = "point at infinity" modulo p but  $[s]P \neq 0$  in  $\mathbb{Z}_n$
- 5. Try to compute [s](P) : a division by p must occur and produce an error
- 6. When a division by some d fails, compute

 $gcd(d, n) \neq 1$ 

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### Elliptic curve factorization method

For a random curve, we expect #E(𝔽<sub>p</sub>) to be ± uniformly distributed in

$$\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) \in [(p+1) - 2\sqrt{p}, (p+1) + 2\sqrt{p}]$$

- Let  $B \approx L_p(1/2)$  so that smoothness probability is about  $(L_p(1/2))^{-1}$
- Repeat with random curves until you get a factor
- Remark : runtime depends on the smallest factor
- ► In practice, the method is used as subroutine to factor middle-size integers when  $\log_2 n \approx 60 80$  bits

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#### Factorization in practice : Magma



No Number Field Sieve involved by default

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# Factorization in practice : Magma




# $\label{eq:Factorization} \mbox{Factorization in practice}: \mbox{CADO-NFS}$

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eps 🔯 Dutheok.com - chris 🗋 🛡 Kodoling 🛡	<ul> <li>Other Localization</li> </ul>
CADO-NES	
JADU-NES	
rible Algébrique: Distributio	n, Optimisation - Number Field Sieve
	)( <u> </u>
Introduction	
Download	Introduction
<ul> <li>Supported Platforms</li> </ul>	Introduction
<ul> <li>Required Software</li> </ul>	
Tools	CADO-NFS is a complete implementation in C/C++ of the Number Field Sieve
Who Used Cado-Nfs	(NFS) algorithm for factoring integers. It consists in various programs
	corresponding to all the phases of the algorithm, and a general script that runs them,
Features	possibly in parallel over a network of computers. Starting with version 2.0 there are
Known Bugs	some functionalities for computing discrete logarithms in finite fields. CADO-NFS
Contact/Support	is distributed under the Gnu Lesser General Public License (LGPL) version 2.1 (or
	any later version).

Probably best available software today !

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# Recommended key lengths



Check www.keylength.com for updates!

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Outline		Elliptic curves	
Generic DLP al	gorithms	<ul> <li>Set of rational points satisfying some cubic equation</li> <li>Group structure given by chord and tangent rule</li> </ul>	on
Index Calculus	for DLP : introduction		
Subexponential	DLP algorithms	R	
Quasi-polynomi	al DLP algorithm		
Factoring algori	ithms	P	
Elliptic Curve D	Discrete Logarithm Problem	R = P + Q	
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# Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)

- ▶ Given *E* over a finite field *K*, Given  $P \in E(K)$ , given  $Q \in G := \langle P \rangle$ , Find  $k \in \mathbb{Z}$  such that Q = kP.
- In practice K is often a prime field, a binary field with prime extension, or  $\mathbb{F}_{p^n}$  with *n* relatively small
- Common belief : best algorithms are generic ones (at least for the parameters used in practice) 160-bit ECDLP ≈ 2048-bit DLP or factoring

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#### Reductions to simpler DLP

- ► Idea : transfer ECDLP to a "simpler" DLP problem through a group homorphism
- ▶ **MOV reduction** if |G| divides  $q^m 1$  [MOV93] Use pairings to transfer ECDLP to DLP on  $K^m$
- Polynomial time for anomalous curves [SA98,S98,S99]
   Transfer ECDLP to a *p*-adic elliptic logarithm if |G| = |K|
- Weil descent for some curves over  $\mathbb{F}p^n$  [GS99,GHS00] Transfer ECDLP to the Jacobian of an hyperelliptic curve
- Only work for specific families

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## Remember : Index calculus

- General method to solve discrete logarithm problems 1. Define a **factor basis**  $\mathcal{F} \subset G$ 
  - 2. Relation search : find about  $|\mathcal{F}|$  relations

ai

$$P + b_i Q = \sum_{P_i \in \mathcal{F}} e_{ij} P_j$$

3. Do **linear algebra** modulo |G| on the relations to get

$$aP+bQ=0$$

- $\blacktriangleright$  Define  ${\cal F}$  s.t. there is an "efficient" algorithm for Step 2
- Balance relation search and linear algebra

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# Index calculus : success stories

- Finite fields : Adleman [A79,A94], Coppersmith [C84], Adleman and Huang [AH99], Joux [J13], Barbulescu-Gaudry-Joux-Thomé [BGJT13] Subexponential complexity for any field Quasipolynomial for small to medium characteristic fields
- Hyperelliptic curves : Adleman-DeMarrais-Huang [ADH94], Enge [E00], Gaudry [G00], Gaudry-Thomé-Thériault-Diem [GTTD07] Subexponential for large genus; beats BSGS if g ≥ 3
- Elliptic curves : no algorithm at all until 2005

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# Index calculus for elliptic curves

- ► For finite fields, **small "primes"** are a natural factor basis
  - Every element factors uniquely as a product of primes
  - "Good" probability that random elements are smooth
- Similarly for elliptic curves, we will need
  - 1. A definition of "small" elements
  - 2. An algorithm to decompose general elements into (potentially) small elements

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First partial solutions given by Semaev [S04]

#### Summation polynomials [504]

- Relate the x-coordinates of points that sum to O
- ►  $S_r(x_1,...,x_r) = 0$  $\Leftrightarrow \exists (x_i,y_i) \in E(\bar{K}) \text{ s.t. } (x_1,y_1) + \cdots + (x_r,y_r) = O$
- Recursive formulae :  $S_2(x_1, x_2) = x_1 - x_2$   $S_3(x_1, x_2, x_3) = ...$  (depends on *E*)  $S_r(x_1, ..., x_r) =$  $Res_X (S_{r-k}(x_1, ..., x_{m-k-1}, X), S_{k+2}(x_{r-k}, ..., x_r, X))$
- *S<sub>r</sub>* has degree 2<sup>*r*−2</sup> in each variable
   Symmetric set of solutions

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# Semaev's variant of index calculus

- Semaev's variant of index calculus :
  - ► Factor basis : define  $\mathcal{F}_V := \{(x, y) \in E | x \in V\}$  where  $V \subset K$
  - ▶ Relation search : for each relation, Compute (X<sub>i</sub>, Y<sub>i</sub>) := a<sub>i</sub>P + b<sub>i</sub>Q for random a<sub>i</sub>, b<sub>i</sub> Find x<sub>j</sub> ∈ V with S<sub>m+1</sub>(x<sub>1</sub>,..., x<sub>m</sub>, X<sub>i</sub>) = 0 Find the corresponding y<sub>i</sub>
- ► Semaev's observation : ECDLP reduced to solving summation's polynomial with constraints x<sub>i</sub> ∈ V
- For K = 𝑘<sub>p</sub>, Semaev proposed V := {x < B} but he could not solve summation polynomials

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Focus on composite fields [G09,D11]

- For  $K := \mathbb{F}_{q^n}$ , Gaudry and Diem proposed  $V := \mathbb{F}_q$
- $\blacktriangleright$  Finding relations amounts to finding  $x_j \in \mathbb{F}_q$  with  $S_{n+1}(x_1,\ldots,x_n,X_i)=0$
- See  $\mathbb{F}_{q^n}$  as a vector space over  $\mathbb{F}_q$
- See polynomial equation S<sub>n+1</sub> = 0 over 𝔽<sub>q<sup>n</sup></sub> as a system of n polynomial equations in n variables over 𝔽<sub>q</sub>
- System can be solved with generic algorithms using complexity polynomial in Bézout bound O(2<sup>n<sup>2</sup></sup>)
- Gives L(2/3) algorithm when  $n \approx \sqrt{\log q} \approx (\log q^n)^{1/3}$

# ECDLP : state-of-the-art

- We have an L(2/3) algorithm to solve ECDLP over fields 𝔽<sub>q<sup>n</sup></sub> if q and n have the right size
- In applications we are interested in ECDLP over either prime fields, or 𝔽<sub>2<sup>n</sup></sub> with extension degree *n* prime
- Some algorithms have been suggested in those cases, but their complexity is unknown

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#### Binary case [D11b, FPPR12]

Let  $K := \mathbb{F}_{2^n}$ . Fix n' < n and  $m \approx n/n'$ 

- ► Factor basis : Choose a vector subspace V of F<sub>2<sup>n</sup></sub> with dimension n' Define F<sub>V</sub> := {(x, y) ∈ E|x ∈ V}
- ▶ Relation search : find about 2<sup>n'</sup> relations. For each one, Compute (X<sub>i</sub>, Y<sub>i</sub>) := a<sub>i</sub>P + b<sub>i</sub>Q for random a<sub>i</sub>, b<sub>i</sub> Find x<sub>j</sub> ∈ V with S<sub>m+1</sub>(x<sub>1</sub>,..., x<sub>m</sub>, X<sub>i</sub>) = 0 Find the corresponding y<sub>j</sub>
- Linear algebra between the relations

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## Finding relations : Weil descent

- $\blacktriangleright$  Finding relations amounts to Finding  $x_i \in V$  with  $S_{m+1}(x_1, \ldots, x_m, X) = 0$
- Let  $\{v_1, \ldots, v_{n'}\}$  be a basis of V Define  $x_{ij} \in \mathbb{F}_2$  such that  $x_i = \sum_{j=1}^{n'} x_{ij} v_j$

$$S_{m+1}\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n'} x_{1j}v_j, \ldots, \sum_{j=1}^{n'} x_{n'j}v_j, X\right) = 0$$

- See  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  as a vector space over  $\mathbb{F}_2$
- The polynomial equation over  $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$  corresponds to a **system** of polynomial equations over  $\mathbb{F}_2$

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# Complexity of characteristic 2 algorithm

• Computing  $S_{m+1}$  with resultants : cost  $2^{t_1}$  where

$$t_1 \approx m(m+1)$$

• Finding  $2^{n'}$  relations : total cost  $2^{t_2}$  where

$$t_2 \approx n' + \log T_R$$

#### where $T_R(m, n', n)$ is time to compute one relation

• (Sparse) linear algebra on relations : cost  $2^{\omega' t_3}$  where

 $t_3 \approx \log m + \log n + \omega' n'$ 

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# Complexity of characteristic 2 algorithm

- Conjectured to be subexponential based on a heuristic assumption on Groebner Basis algorithms behavior and experimental results [PQ12]
- Original assumption perhaps too optimistic
- Still an open problem

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# **ECDLP** over Prime Fields

- No vector space available to define the factor basis
- Find a rational map  $L = \circ_{j=1}^{n'} L_j$  with a large zero set
- Define a factor basis  $\mathcal{F} = \{(x, y) \in E(\mathcal{K}) | L(x) = 0\}$
- Each relation search now amounts to solving

$$\begin{cases} S_{m+1}(x_{11}, \dots, x_{m1}, X) = 0\\ x_{i,j+1} = L_j(x_{i,j}) & i = 1, \dots, m; j = 1, \dots, n' - 1\\ 0 = L_{n'}(x_{i,n'}) & i = 1, \dots, m. \end{cases}$$

Complexity is an open problem

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Outline	Conclusion on (EC)DLP and factoring
Generic DLP algorithms	
Index Calculus for DLP : introduction	<ul><li>Very active field of research, with recent breakthroughs</li><li>Research challenges</li></ul>
Subexponential DLP algorithms	<ul><li>Find new algorithms for these problems</li><li>Analyze existing algorithms</li></ul>
Quasi-polynomial DLP algorithm	<ul> <li>Consider related problems</li> <li>Come to me if interested in a project in the area</li> </ul>
Factoring algorithms	Recommended key sizes : www.keylength.com
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem	

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