Factorisation and Discrete-Logarithm Algorithms



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Outline

- Factorization algorithms
- Generic discrete logarithm algorithms
- 3 Discrete logarithms over finite fields

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Integer factorization

Problem: Given a composite number N, which is the product of two n-bit primes, compute one of its factors.

Trial Divison: try every prime number up to \sqrt{N} . Running time is, at worst, $O(\sqrt{N} \cdot \text{polylog}(N))$.

Can we do better?

- It can be used to factor any arbitrary integer N = pq.
- Idea: find a **good** pair (x, y) s.t. $x = y \pmod{p}$ but $x \neq y \pmod{N}$.
- This implies that gcd(x y, N) = p, and therefore a non-trivial factor of N is obtained.
- Define some "pseudorandom" iteration function f (a standard choice would be $f(x) = x^2 + 1 \mod N$. It has the property that, if $x = x' \pmod p$, then $f(x) = f(x') \pmod p$.)
- At step *i*-th, compute x_i, x_{2i} and $gcd(x_i x_{2i}, N)$.
- By birthday's bound, a pair (x_i, x_{2i}) s.t. $x_i = x_{2i} \pmod{p}$ is expected to be found after $O(p^{1/2})$ trials on average.

```
1: Input: integer N (a product of two n-bit primes)
2: a := b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*
3: for i \in \{2, \dots, 2^{n/2}\} do
4: a := f(a)
5: b := f(f(b))
6: p := \gcd(a - b, N)
7: if p \notin \{1, N\} then
8: return p.
9: end if
10: end for
```

Pollard's p-1 and Elliptic curve factorization methods

- Pollard's p-1 is an effective method if p-1 has only "small" prime factors.
- Elliptic-curve factorisation method generalises it when neither p-1 nor q-1 are smooth.
- The group order $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ of an elliptic curve E can be smooth even when p-1 is not!
- Choosing *strong primes* for RSA, i.e. p-1 and q-1 both have large prime factors, can help against Pollard's p-1, but not against Elliptic-curve factorisation method or Number Field Sieve.

- It runs in sub-exponential time in the length of N. Good choice for numbers up to about 300 bits long.
- Try to factor 8051. $8051 = 90^2 7^2 = (90 7)(90 + 7) = 83 \times 97$.
- **Idea**: find a, b s.t. $a^2 = b^2 \pmod{N}$ but $a \neq \pm b \pmod{N}$. Hence $\gcd(a b, N)$ gives one non trivial factor of N.

- Fix some bound $B \in \mathbb{N}$, and let $\mathcal{F} = \{p_1, \dots, p_k\}$ the set of primes less than or equal to B.
- Search for integers x_i , where $x_1 = \lceil \sqrt{N} \rceil$, $x_2 = \lceil \sqrt{N} \rceil + 1, ...$, s.t. $q_i := x_i^2 \pmod{N}$ is *B*-smooth, and factor them.
- Find a subset S of $\{q_i\}_i$ such that the product of its elements is a square, i.e.

$$\prod_{j \in S} q_j = \prod_{\ell=1}^k p_\ell^{\sum_{j \in S} e_{j,\ell}} \quad s.t. \quad \sum_{j \in S} e_{j,\ell} = 0 \pmod{2} \quad \forall \ell \in \{1,\ldots,k\}$$

• S can be found using linear algebra.

Define the matrix of exponents (modulo 2) as follows:

$$\begin{pmatrix} e_{1,1} \pmod{2} & e_{1,2} \pmod{2} & \dots & e_{1,k} \pmod{2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ e_{m,1} \pmod{2} & e_{m,2} \pmod{2} & \dots & e_{m,k} \pmod{2} \end{pmatrix}$$

• If m = k + 1, then there exists a nonempty subset S of rows that sum to the zero vector modulo 2.

• Take N = 377753. We can compute the following:

$$620^{2} \mod N = 17^{2} \cdot 23$$

$$621^{2} \mod N = 2^{4} \cdot 17 \cdot 29$$

$$645^{2} \mod N = 2^{7} \cdot 13 \cdot 23$$

$$655^{2} \mod N = 2^{3} \cdot 13 \cdot 17 \cdot 29$$

$$(620 \cdot 621 \cdot 645 \cdot 655 \pmod{N})^2 = (2^7 \cdot 13 \cdot 17^2 \cdot 23 \cdot 29)^2 \pmod{N}$$

 $\Rightarrow 127194^2 = 45335^2 \pmod{N}$


Since $127194 \neq \pm 45335 \pmod{N}$, gcd(127194 - 45335, 377753) = 751 gives a non trivial factor of N.

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- Generic discrete logarithm algorithms
- Discrete logarithms over finite fields

Why Discrete Logarithm?

A graph of $f(x) = 627^{x} \pmod{941}$ for x = 1, 2, 3, ...



Discrete logarithms

- Trivial if $(G, \circ) = (\mathbb{F}_p, +)$. Why?
- Recently broken if $(G, \circ) = (\mathbb{F}_{2^n}^*, *)$ (more generally if characteristic is small)
- Believed to be hard for $G = \mathbb{F}_p^*$ and harder for (well-chosen) elliptic curve groups

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Generic group model

- Algorithms do not exploit any special properties of the encodings of the group elements, other than the fact that each group element is encoded as a unique binary string.
- For instance, the attacker just receives bitstrings instead of \mathbb{Z}_n elements (n itself is often hidden but the size of n cannot be hidden).
- Operations on group elements are performed using an oracle that provides access to the group operations.
- Some attacks are generic: they work for any group.
- This includes exhaustive search, BSGS, Pollard's rho
- There exist much better attacks for finite fields.
- Still no better attack for (well-chosen) elliptic curves.

Exhaustive search

Given $g, h \in G$ do the following:

- 1: $k \leftarrow 1$; $h' \leftarrow g$
- 2: if h' = h then
- 3: return k
- 4: else
- 5: $k \leftarrow k+1$; $h' \leftarrow h'g$
- 6: Go to Step 2
- 7: end if
- · Generic algorithm
- Time complexity |G| in the worst case
- Can we do better?

Pohlig-Hellman

- They observed that Dlog in a group G is as hard as the Dlog in the largest subgroup of prime order in G.
- This applies in any arbitrary finite abelian group.
- Assume $|\mathbb{G}| = N = n_1 n_2$ and let g a generator of G.
- $h = g^k$ implies $h^{n_1} = (g^{n_1})^k$ where g^{n_1} generates a subgroup of order n_2 .
- Assuming that we can solve DLP in that subgroup, this would give us k mod n₂.
- Repeating the same thing for each factor of N and using CRT would give us k.

Pohlig-Hellman

- Let $\mathbb{G}=\langle g
 angle$ of order $N=\#\mathbb{G}=\prod_{i=1}^\ell p_i^{e_i}$
- Given $h = g^x$, we want to first find $x \mod p_i^{e_i}$ and then use CRT to recover it mod N.
- There is a group isomorphism $\phi: \mathbb{G} \to C_{p_1^{e_1}} \times \cdots \times C_{p_s^{e_s}}$.
- Define the projection map $\phi_{p_i}:\mathbb{G}\to C_{p_i^{e_i}}$ where $\phi_{p_i}(g)=g^{N/p_i^{e_i}}$. ϕ_{p_i} is a group homomorphism, i.e., if $h=g^x$ in \mathbb{G} , then $\phi_{p_i}(h)=\phi_{p_i}(g)^x$ in $C_{p_i^{e_i}}$.
- Solving the discrete logarithm in $C_{p_i^{e_i}}$ reduces to solving e_i discrete logarithm in the group C_{p_i} following an inductive procedure.
- Given $h'=g^{x'}\in C_{p_i^{e_i}}$, we write $x'=x_0+x_1p_i+\cdots+x_{e_i-1}p_i^{e_i-1}$ and then find x_0,x_1,\ldots,x_{e_i-1} in turn.

- Given a public cyclic group $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$, now we can assume that \mathbb{G} has a prime order p.
- Given $h \in \mathbb{G}$, find the value of k s.t. $h = g^k$.
- Let $N' = \lceil \sqrt{|\mathbb{G}|} \rceil$
- There exist $0 \le i, j < N'$ such that k = jN' + i

$$h = g^{jN'+i} \Leftrightarrow hg^{-jN'} = g^i$$

- Compute $L_B := \{g^i | i = 0, \dots, N' 1\}$
- Compute $L_G := \{hg^{-jN'}|j=0,\ldots,N'-1\}$
- Attack requires time and memory each $\mathcal{O}\left(|\mathbb{G}|^{1/2}\right)$
- Can we do better in terms of space requirement and still obtain a time complexity of $\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{|\mathbb{G}|}\right)$

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Pollard's Algorithms

- John Pollard, a famous name in factoring/Dlog algorithms in the 20th century.
- Known for (P-1) method, Rho-method, Number Field Sieve.
- The idea in the Rho method is to find a collision in a random mapping.
- Using the birthday paradox naively is no better than Baby-Step/Giant-Step method in terms of space/time requirements.
- Similar to the improved birthday paradox attack on hash functions, we can use Floyd's cycle finding algorithm, i.e. given (x_i, x_{2i}) , we compute

$$(x_{i+1}, x_{2i+2}) = (f(x_i), f(f(x_{2i})))$$

• We stop when $x_{\ell} = x_{2\ell}$

- Define the sets G_1, G_2, G_3 of about the same size such that $G = G_1 \cup G_2 \cup G_3$ and $G_i \cap G_i = \{\}$, assuming that $1 \notin G_2$.
- Over \mathbb{Z}_p^* , one can choose $G_1 = \{0, \dots, \lfloor p/3 \rfloor \},$ $G_2 = \{\lfloor p/3 \rfloor + 1, \dots, \lfloor 2p/3 \rfloor \},$ $G_3 = \{\lfloor 2p/3 \rfloor + 1, \dots, p-2 \}$
- Define a random walk $f: G \rightarrow G$ such that

$$x_{i+1} = f(x_i) = \begin{cases} hx_i & x_i \in G_1 \\ x_i^2 & x_i \in G_2 \\ gx_i & x_i \in G_3 \end{cases}$$

- Given $g, h = g^x$, we start from $x_0 := 1$ and apply f recursively to get $\{x_i, x_{2i}\}_i$.
- By the way f is defined, we can keep track of (x_t, a_t, b_t) such that $x_t = g^{a_t}h^{b_t}$, where

$$a_{i+1} = \begin{cases} a_i & & \\ 2a_i \mod p & \\ a_i + 1 \mod p \end{cases}, b_{i+1} = \begin{cases} b_i + 1 \mod p & x_i \in G_1 \\ 2b_i \mod p & x_i \in G_2 \\ b_i & x_i \in G_3 \end{cases}$$

- We stop when a collision is found, i.e. $x_{\ell} = x_{2\ell}$, therefore $x = \frac{a_{2\ell} a_{\ell}}{h_{\ell} h_{2\ell}} \mod p$.
- If f is "random enough", then we should find the Dlog in expected time $\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{|G|}\right)$.

```
1: N \leftarrow \lceil \sqrt{|G|} \rceil
2: a_1 = 0; b_1 = 0; x_1 = 1
3: (x_2, a_2, b_2) = f(x_1, a_1, b_1)
4: for k \in \{2, ..., N\} do
5: (x_1, a_1, b_1) = f(x_1, a_1, b_1)
6: (x_2, a_2, b_2) = f(f(x_2, a_2, b_2))
 7: if x_1 = x_2 break;
8: end for
9: if b_1 = b_2 \mod p then
10.
    return |
11: else
       return(a_2 - a_1)/(b_1 - b_2) \mod p
13: end if
```

Pollard's Rho: example

Example (Smart's book)

Consider $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$, a subgroup of \mathbb{F}_{607}^* of order p = 101, with g = 64. Given $h = 122 = 64^x$. Solve for x.

We split \mathbb{G} into three sets S_1, S_2, S_3 as follows:

$$S_1 = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_{607}^* : x \le 201\}$$

$$S_2 = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_{607}^* : 202 \le x \le 403\}$$

$$S_3 = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_{607}^* : 404 \le x \le 606\}$$

Pollard's Rho: example

Example

A collision is found when i=14, this implies that $g^0h^{12}=g^{64}h^6$, so $[12x=64+6x \mod 101]$ and therefore x=78.

More from Pollard

- Pollard's Lambda Method: similar to the Rho method in that it
 uses deterministic random walk, but it is particularly designed
 to the cases where we know that the Dlog lies in a particular
 interval.
- Parallel Pollard's Rho: designed to be able to use computing resources of different sites across the internet.

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L notation

$$L_Q(\alpha; c) = \exp(c(\log Q)^{\alpha}(\log \log Q)^{1-\alpha})$$

- Q is the size of the field
- $\alpha = 0 \Rightarrow L_Q(\alpha; c) = (\log Q)^c$ polynomial
- $\alpha = 1 \Rightarrow L_Q(\alpha; c) = Q^c$ exponential

(simplified) Index Calculus for \mathbb{F}_p^*

- DLP: given $g, h \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$, find x such that $h = g^x$
- Factor basis made of small primes

$$\mathcal{F}_B := \{ \text{primes } p_i \leq B \} = \{ p_1, \dots, p_k \}$$

- Relation search
 - Compute $g_i := g^{a_i}$ for random $a_i \in \{1, ..., p-1\}$
 - ∘ **If** all factors of g_i are $\leq B$, we have a relation

$$g^{a_i} = \prod_{p_i \in \mathcal{F}} p_j^{e_{i,j}} \tag{1}$$

- **Linear algebra** Once we have $\ell \geq k$ linearly independent equations similar to equations (1), we solve $\mod (p-1)$ for $\log_{\rho} p_i$, $i=1,\ldots,k$.
- Search for t such that $[g^t \cdot h \mod p]$ is B-smooth. Once found, solve for $\log_g h \mod (p-1)$.

Size of the factor basis

By the prime number theorem,

$$|\{\text{primes }p_i \leq B\}| pprox rac{B}{\log B}$$

 Fact: 30% of all numbers have no prime factors above their square root. Surprisingly, a large proportion of numbers can be built out of so few primes!

- How to choose an optimal B: If B is large, then it is more likely that the generated elements are B-smooth, but then testing that they are B-smooth is more difficult now. Therefore, we need to balance the cost!
- In order to choose an optimal B, we also need to know the probability that a random integer that is smaller than N is B-smooth.
- We will assume that the cost of generating relations dominates the overall complexity of Algorithm, i.e. assume that the linear algebra is negligible in terms of time complexity.
- We will simply use the trial-division to factor over \mathcal{F}_B .

- A number is *B*-smooth if all its prime factors are smaller than *B*.
- Define $\Psi(N, B) = \#\{B\text{-smooth numbers} \leq N\}.$
- The probability that a positive integer $m \le N$ is B-smooth is approximately equal to $\frac{1}{N} \cdot \Psi(N,B)$.
- The Canfield-Erdos-Pomerance Theorem: Let $u=\frac{\log N}{\log B}$, we have $\frac{1}{N}\cdot \Psi(N,B)=u^{-u+o(u)}$. This is the *Dickman-de Bruijn* function ρ , i.e. $\rho(u)\approx u^{-u}$.
- The expected number of random trials of choosing numbers in [1; N] to find one that is B-smooth is $\approx u^u$

• Let $|\mathcal{F}_B| = k$, the expected running time of the algorithm is

$$\approx \underbrace{(k+1)}_{\text{nb of relations}} \cdot \underbrace{u^u}_{\text{expected nb of trials}} \cdot \underbrace{k}_{\text{time for a trial divisions}} \cdot \underbrace{M(\log N)}_{\text{time for a trial division}}$$
(2)

$$\approx B^2 \cdot u^u$$
 drop the logarithmic factors, where $k \approx \frac{B}{\log B}$ (3)

$$=N^{2/u}\cdot u^u\tag{4}$$

- We want to minimize $f(u) = N^{2/u} \cdot u^u$. If we set f'(u) = 0, we need a u s.t. $u^2 \log u \approx 2 \log N$.
- Let $u = 2\sqrt{\frac{\log N}{\log \log N}}$, we then get $u^2 \log u = 2 \log N + o(\log N)$

Back to our bound B:

$$B = N^{1/u}$$

$$= exp(\frac{1}{u}\log N)$$

$$= exp(\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\log N \log \log N})$$

$$= L_N(1/2, 1/2)$$

- Note that $u^u = L_N(1/2, 1)$, therefore $B^2 u^u = L_N(1/2, 2)$.
- The cost of the linear algebra step is bounded by $\tilde{O}(B^3)$, i.e. $L_N(1/2,3/2)$.

Further Reading (1)

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