

Introduction to Cryptology

1.2 - Cryptography Today and Tomorrow

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Cryptography Today and Tomorrow

The advent of new information technologies has led to **advanced cryptographic techniques**.

- ❖ some techniques have been already deployed
- ❖ some are the basis of technologies that have not yet reached the general public or are still under construction

Multi-Party Computation

Context: n parties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, each having a secret input s_i .

Objective: evaluate a public function f on input $(s_1, \dots, s_n)$ while **keeping** each secret input hidden from the other parties.

Technique: Multi-Party Computation.

Multi-Party Computation: an application



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bAp_aZgX3B0

Secret Sharing

Context: a dealer distributes a secret s amongst n parties $P_1, \dots, P_n$, giving to each party a share s_i .

Objective: at least t shares must be combined to reconstruct s (less shares should not provide any information about s).

Technique: Secret Sharing scheme.

Shamir Secret Sharing (1979)

Lagrange Interpolating Polynomial

Given n points $(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_n, y_n)$, $P(x) = \sum_{j=1}^n y_j P_j(x)$ with

$$P_j(x) = \prod_{\substack{k=1 \\ k \neq j}}^n (x - x_k) / (x_j - x_k),$$

is the unique polynomial of degree $\leq (n - 1)$ that passes through all the n points.


- ❖ Shares: let $Q(x) \in \mathbb{F}_p[x]$ be a random polynomial of degree $t - 1$ s.t. $Q(0) = s$. Then $s_i := Q(i)$.
- ❖ Reconstruct the secret: using Lagrange interpolation, any t participants can together compute $Q(0)$.

Bitcoin - the first decentralised digital coin

Get started with Bitcoin


Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology to operate with no central authority or banks; managing transactions and the issuing of bitcoins is carried out collectively by the network. **Bitcoin is open-source; its design is public, nobody owns or controls Bitcoin and everyone can take part.** Through many of its unique properties, Bitcoin allows exciting uses that could not be covered by any previous payment system.

-  Fast peer-to-peer transactions
-  Worldwide payments
-  Low processing fees



<https://bitcoin.org/en/>

Altcoins



[https://coinmarketcap.com/\(06/10/2020\)](https://coinmarketcap.com/(06/10/2020))

E-voting

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Estonia Election: What U.S. Ca... x

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← → ↺

time.com/5541876/estonia-elections-electronic-voting/

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≡ TIME

What the U.S. Can Learn About Electronic Voting From This Tiny Eastern European Nation

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BY **BILLY PERRIGO**  MARCH 1, 2019

On Sunday, when citizens of the tiny Baltic nation of **Estonia** go out to vote for their next parliament, many of their compatriots will have already voted — from the comfort of their own homes.

That's because Estonia is the world leader in electronic voting. Since 2005, Estonians have been able to cast their ballots from a computer with an Internet connection anywhere in the world. The government says 30% of Estonia's population of 1.3 million people use the system, and that its simplicity helps save the country a total of 11,000 working days each election year.

When Home Isn't Where the Heart Is



WORLD

The Suwalki Gap: The Most Vulnerable Stretch of Land in Europe



SPORTS

Meet The Estonian Triplets Who Are Competing Against...



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Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Context: two parties, P and V , interact over a channel.

Objective: P proves to V that some mathematical statement is true, without revealing anything else.

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Technique: Zero-Knowledge Proof.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs - A Definition of Security

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- ❖ Completeness: If a given mathematical statement is true, P always convinces V .
- ❖ Soundness: P cannot convince V if the mathematical statement is false.
- ❖ Zero-Knowledge: The proof does not reveal any extra information beyond the validity of the statement.

Zero-Knowledge Proofs - Gentle introductions

- ❖ An informal blog post:

<http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/11/zero-knowledge-proofs-illustrated-primer.html>

- ❖ An online demo:

<http://web.mit.edu/~ezyang/Public/graph/svg.html>

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Context: users storing data in a cloud system.

Objective: allow the cloud system to perform computation on encrypted data (no encryption keys given).

Technique: Fully Homomorphic Encryption.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- ❖ Some encryption schemes are naturally **partially** homomorphic, e.g. $E_e(m_1) \times E_e(m_2) = E_e(m_1 \times m_2)$.

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- ❖ **Fully** homomorphic encryption allows for **arbitrary** computation on ciphertexts.
- ❖ In theory, this was proven possible in 2009. In practice, it is still far away from being practical!

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Integer factorisation and discrete logarithm problem can be solved *efficiently* with Shor's quantum algorithm.

New hard problems have been proposed and used to construct *quantum – resistant* cryptosystems.

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- ❖ Code-based Cryptography (e.g. McEliece cryptosystem)

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- ❖ Hash-based Cryptography (e.g. SPHINCS⁺ signature)
- ❖ Multivariate Cryptography (e.g. Rainbow signature)
- ❖ Isogeny-based Cryptography (e.g. SIKE)

Further Reading I



Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Myriam Quisquater, Muriel Quisquater, Michaël Quisquater, Louis Guillou, Marie Guillou, Gaïd Guillou, Anna Guillou, Gwenolé Guillou, and Soazig Guillou.

How to explain zero-knowledge protocols to your children.
In *Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO'89 Proceedings*,
pages 628–631. Springer, 1990.



Alice Silverberg.

Mathematics and cryptography: A marriage of
convenience?

In *Annual International Conference on the Theory and
Applications of Cryptographic Techniques - EUROCRYPT
2020*, pages 3–9. Springer, Cham., 2020.

Further Reading II



Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov.

The first collision for full sha-1.

In Annual International Cryptology Conference - CRYPTO 2017, pages 570–596. Springer, Cham., 2017.