# Introduction to Cryptology 1.3 - Historical Ciphers

#### Federico Pintore

Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford (UK)



Michaelmas term 2020

Classical Cryptography mainly pursued secrecy.

Classical Cryptography mainly pursued secrecy.

Several *symmetric – key encryption schemes* were designed:

Classical Cryptography mainly pursued secrecy.

Several *symmetric – key encryption schemes* were designed:

- no clear definitions of security,
- no proofs of security.

Classical Cryptography mainly pursued secrecy.

Several *symmetric – key encryption schemes* were designed:

- no clear definitions of security,
- no proofs of security.

We review some of them, in order to learn some lessons.

Encryption scheme:  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \{E_e | e \in \mathcal{K}\}, \{D_d | d \in \mathcal{K}\})$ 

Encryption scheme:  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \{E_e | e \in \mathcal{K}\}, \{D_d | d \in \mathcal{K}\})$ 

A secret key (e = d) is shared beforehand by the communicating parties.

Encryption scheme:  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \{E_e | e \in \mathcal{K}\}, \{D_d | d \in \mathcal{K}\})$ 

A secret key (e = d) is shared beforehand by the communicating parties.

The <u>sender</u> encrypts a message, i.e. hides it, using  $E_e$  and obtains the ciphertext.

Encryption scheme:  $(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \{E_e | e \in \mathcal{K}\}, \{D_d | d \in \mathcal{K}\})$ 

A secret key (e = d) is shared beforehand by the communicating parties.

The <u>sender</u> encrypts a message, i.e. hides it, using  $E_e$  and obtains the ciphertext.

The <u>receiver</u> decrypts the ciphertext, i.e. unhides it, using  $D_d$ . They recover the original plaintext.

### **Caesar Cipher**

- $\blacktriangleright \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \{ \text{English words} \}$
- $\mathcal{K} = \{1, \dots, 26\}$
- $E_e$  shifts each letter of e positions to the right
- **D**<sub>e</sub> shifts each letter of e positions to the left

### **Caesar Cipher**

- $\blacktriangleright \mathcal{M} = \mathcal{C} = \{ \text{English words} \}$
- $\mathcal{K} = \{1, \dots, 26\}$
- $E_e$  shifts each letter of e positions to the right
- **D**<sub>e</sub> shifts each letter of e positions to the left

#### Example

- Plaintext: UNSAFE
- ► Key: *e* = 3
- Ciphertext: XQVDIH

Brute Force (try every possible key):  $|\mathcal{K}|$  is only 26.

Brute Force (try every possible key):  $|\mathcal{K}|$  is only 26.

Sufficient key-space principle: a secure symmetric-key encryption scheme must have a key space large enough to make a brute force attack infeasible  $(|\mathcal{K}| \ge 2^{70})$ .

Brute Force (try every possible key):  $|\mathcal{K}|$  is only 26.

Sufficient key-space principle: a secure symmetric-key encryption scheme must have a key space large enough to make a brute force attack infeasible  $(|\mathcal{K}| \ge 2^{70})$ .

Is it a sufficient condition?

#### Substitution Cipher (mono-alphabetic)

- $\mathcal{K} = \{ \text{permutations } p \text{ of the English alphabet} \}$
- $E_p$  applies p to each letter of the plaintext
- D<sub>p</sub> applies  $p^{-1}$  to each letter of the ciphertext

#### Substitution Cipher (mono-alphabetic)

- $\mathcal{K} = \{ \text{permutations } p \text{ of the English alphabet} \}$
- $E_p$  applies p to each letter of the plaintext
- D<sub>p</sub> applies  $p^{-1}$  to each letter of the ciphertext

#### Example

- Plaintext: UNSAFE
- Key: p is the permutation sending A in T, ..., E in N, F in L, ..., N in R, ..., S in O, ..., U in H, ...
- Ciphertext: HROTLN

The brute force attack is not feasible, as  $|\mathcal{K}| = 26! \approx 2^{88}$ .

The brute force attack is not feasible, as  $|\mathcal{K}| = 26! \approx 2^{88}$ .

Frequency analysis can be performed:

The brute force attack is not feasible, as  $|\mathcal{K}| = 26! \approx 2^{88}$ .

Frequency analysis can be performed:

Frequency of English letters



The brute force attack is not feasible, as  $|\mathcal{K}| = 26! \approx 2^{88}$ .

Frequency analysis can be performed:





 Frequency of pairs (or more) of letters, e.g. digrams, trigrams, etc.

### Vigenère Cipher (1553)

- $\mathcal{K} = \{(p_1, \dots, p_t) | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$ , where  $p_i$  is a circular permutation of the English alphabet
- $E_{(p_1,\ldots,p_t)}$  splits the plaintext into subsets of t letters and then applies  $(p_1,\ldots,p_t)$
- ▶  $D_{(p_1,...,p_l)}$  splits the ciphertext into subsets of *t* letters and then applies  $(p_1^{-1},...,p_l^{-1})$

## Vigenère Cipher (1553)

- $\mathcal{K} = \{(p_1, \dots, p_t) | t \in \mathbb{N}\}$ , where  $p_i$  is a circular permutation of the English alphabet
- $E_{(p_1,\ldots,p_t)}$  splits the plaintext into subsets of t letters and then applies  $(p_1,\ldots,p_t)$
- $D_{(p_1,...,p_l)}$  splits the ciphertext into subsets of t letters and then applies  $(p_1^{-1},\ldots,p_l^{-1})$

#### Example

- Plaintext: TOBEORNOTTOBE
- ► Key: (*p*<sub>1</sub>,...,*p*<sub>6</sub>), represented by CRYPTO (*p*<sub>1</sub> shifts each letter 3 positions to the right, ...)
- Ciphertext: VFZTHFPFRIHPG

#### Cryptanalysis of the Vigenère Cipher

When the value of t is known, break the ciphertext into blocks. Then each block is as it was encrypted by the Caesar cipher.

#### Cryptanalysis of the Vigenère Cipher

When the value of t is known, break the ciphertext into blocks. Then each block is as it was encrypted by the Caesar cipher.

When t is not known, use Kasiski method (Kasiski 1863) or the *index of coincidence method* to recover t.

#### Cryptanalysis of the Vigenère Cipher

When the value of t is known, break the ciphertext into blocks. Then each block is as it was encrypted by the Caesar cipher.

When t is not known, use Kasiski method (Kasiski 1863) or the *index of coincidence method* to recover t.

Important: when t is equal to number of letters of the plaintext (and the key is used only once), the above attacks do not work!

### **Lessons** learned

Having a formal proof of security is essential.

Clear security definitions help with the design of cryptographic schemes, and they are required for security proofs.

History has shown that maintaining the design of a scheme secret is very difficult. Making the design public has several advantages (public scrutiny, standardisation, ...)

### **Further Reading**

- Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Myriam Quisquater, Muriel Quisquater, Michaël Quisquater, Louis Guillou, Marie Guillou, Gaïd Guillou, Anna Guillou, Gwenolé Guillou, and Soazig Guillou.
  - How to explain zero-knowledge protocols to your children. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO'89 Proceedings, pages 628–631. Springer, 1990.

#### Alice Silverberg.

Mathematics and cryptography: A marriage of convenience?

In Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques - EUROCRYPT 2020, pages 3–9. Springer, Cham., 2020.  Marc Stevens, Elie Bursztein, Pierre Karpman, Ange Albertini, and Yarik Markov.
The first collision for full sha-1.
In Annual International Cryptology Conference - CRYPTO 2017, pages 570–596. Springer, Cham., 2017.