

Mathematical Institute

MSc mathematical modelling (weeks 7-8)

Mathematical modelling of infectious disease outbreaks

Robin Thompson

Associate Professor, Mathematical Institute and St Hilda's College

University of Oxford


Next term...

- Case study in mathematical modelling
- Work in a group of around 5-6 students on a modelling research project [last year: cycle races, Alzheimer's modelling etc...]
- Work on project throughout Hilary term
- Deliver group presentation (20% of final mark)
- Write individual project report (80% of final mark)

Now!

- Today: 2-hour introduction to infectious disease modelling
- Tomorrow: Assign groups and start infectious disease modelling "mini project"
- Next Monday 2-4: Work on group mini project, prepare slides
- Next Tuesday 3-4: Report back on your mini project (3-5 slides per group; please email slides to me by noon next Tuesday robin.thompson@maths.ox.ac.uk)
- This is an opportunity to practise group work (not assessed)
- In the next 2 hours, I will give you some suggestions for possible mini projects to do over the next week: your group can do one of these, all of these, or something different!
- Have fun!!!

Modelling for real-time outbreak response



Before

- Where is an outbreak most likely to occur?
- Where should surveillance resources be deployed?

Beginning

- Will initial cases lead to a major epidemic?
- Which interventions reduce the epidemic risk?

Middle

- How effective are current interventions?
- Which interventions optimally balance benefits and costs?

End


- How should interventions be lifted?
- Is the epidemic over?

Outline


- 1. Introduction to common infectious disease outbreak models
 - Compartmental models
 - · Renewal equation models
- 2. Early in an outbreak: Assessing the risk of major epidemics
 - Estimating the probability of a major epidemic [stochastic compartmental model]
 - Possible mini project
- 3. During an epidemic: Assessing the effectiveness of current interventions
 - Inferring current transmissibility [renewal equation model]
 - Possible mini project
- 4. At the end of an epidemic: Assessing when the epidemic is over
 - End-of-outbreak probability estimation [compartmental model and renewal equation model]
 - · Possible mini project

Outbreak waves have a characteristic "shape"







Foot and mouth in the UK 2001



Plague in Mumbai in 1906



Ebola in West Africa in 2014-15




First compartmental models

(early 20th century)

aimed to capture this shape

Compartmental models: SIR model




Boarding school flu epidemic


$$\frac{\mathrm{d}S}{\mathrm{d}t} = -\beta SI$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}I}{\mathrm{d}t} = \beta SI - \mu I$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}t} = \mu I$$



Compartmental models: SIR model



Boarding school flu epidemic

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}S}{\mathrm{d}t} = -\beta SI$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}I}{\mathrm{d}t} = \beta SI - \mu I$$

$$\frac{\mathrm{d}R}{\mathrm{d}t} = \mu I$$

$$000$$

$$001$$


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Involves assumptions
(homogeneous mixing, infected individuals immediately infectious, etc)


But... not bad for a two-parameter model

Compartmental models: SIR model


• R_0 – Number of cases of disease arising from each primary case (in an entirely susceptible population)

 R_0 = Infection rate x Duration of infection


$$R_0 = \beta N \times 1/\mu$$




1. Infectious disease outbreaks are inherently random




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


How to run one simulation of stochastic SIR model (using Gillespie direct method):

- Assume that events occur at exponentially distributed time intervals. The time until the next event therefore follows an exponential distribution with rate parameter $\beta SI + \mu I$.
- The probability that the next event is an infection is:

Prob(infection) =
$$\frac{\beta SI}{\beta SI + \mu I}$$
. Similarly, Prob(removal) = $\frac{\mu I}{\beta SI + \mu I}$

1. Infectious disease outbreaks are inherently random



How to run one simulation of stochastic SIR model (using Gillespie direct method):

- 1. Initialise the number of individuals in each of the S, I and R classes in the model, and set the outbreak time t = 0.
- 2. Steps 2-4 should be repeated while the outbreak is still ongoing (i.e. l > 0). First calculate two random numbers r_1 , r_2 each uniformly distributed in (0,1).
- 3. Calculate the time of the next event from an exponential distribution. Set


$$t = t + \frac{1}{\beta IS + \mu I} \ln \left(\frac{1}{r_1} \right).$$

4. Choose whether the next event is an infection event or removal event. If


$$r_2 < \frac{\beta IS}{\beta IS + \mu I},$$

then the next event is an infection event, and so set S = S - 1 and I = I + 1. Otherwise set I = I - 1 and R = R + 1.


2. Different epidemiology




Delay between infection and becoming infectious:




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
Delay between infection and becoming infectious:




Waning immunity:



3. Age structure







Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Theoretical Biology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/yjtbi




interventions in age-structured populations: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study Estimating local outbreak risks and the effects of non-pharmaceutical




Francesca A. Lovell-Read a.*, Silvia Shen a.b, Robin N. Thompson c.d

4. Asymptomatic transmission




Fraser et al. (PNAS, 2004)






5. Spatial structure





Compartmental models: Testing interventions


Models can be used to test counterfactual ("what if") interventions




Compartmental models: Testing interventions

Interventions with increasing complexity can be tested

Reduce R₀ periodically via social distancing to keep healthcare demand "manageable"







Adapted from research on COVID-19 by Imperial and LSHTM

Avoid need to divide hosts into compartments; simply count infections

Avoid need to divide hosts into compartments; simply count infections







$$E(I_t \mid R_t, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{t-1}\}) = R_t \sum_{s=1}^t I_{t-s} w_s$$

 $I_{\rm t}$ cases \longrightarrow Draw from Poisson distribution or NB distribution







Draw from Poisson distribution or NB distribution


63

49

77

91

Commonly used to infer R_t (more later in talk)




Outline

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Early in an outbreak

When a pathogen first arrives in a new host population, will initial cases fade out, or will they lead to a major epidemic?





R.N. Thompson


Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Theoretical Biology




A practical guide to mathematical methods for estimating infectious disease









When a pathogen first arrives in a new population, there are two possibilities for what happens next






When a pathogen first arrives in a new population, there are two possibilities for what happens next




Infected


Removed



happens next

Susceptible







Epidemic Risk: the probability that an imported case leads to a major epidemic

If ER = 0; a major epidemic will not occur

If ER = 1; a major epidemic will definitely occur






- Assume we start with one infected individual
- Denote q_i = Prob(\underline{no} major epidemic starting from i infected individuals)
- Want to find $1 q_1$






A practical guide to mathematical methods for estimating infectious disease outbreak risks






Two possibilities for the next event: infection or recovery

$$q_1 = \mathbb{P}(\text{infection}) \times q_2 + \mathbb{P}(\text{recovery}) \times q_0$$



Two possibilities for the next event: infection or recovery

$$q_1 \approx \mathbb{P}(\text{infection}) \times q_1^2 + \mathbb{P}(\text{recovery})$$



Two possibilities for the next event: infection or recovery

$$q_1 \approx \mathbb{P}(\text{infection}) \times q_1^2 + \mathbb{P}(\text{recovery})$$

$$q_1 = \frac{1}{R_e}$$
 or 1 $ER = 1 - q_1 = 1 - \frac{1}{R_e}$

INTERFACE

royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif

Research



Will an outbreak exceed available resources for control? Estimating the risk from invading pathogens using practical definitions of a severe epidemic

R. N. Thompson^{1,2}, C. A. Gilligan³ and N. J. Cunniffe³



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Theoretical Biology



A practical guide to mathematical methods for estimating infectious disease

E. Southall a,b, Z. Ogi-Gittins a,b, A.R. Kaye a,b, W.S. Hart c, F.A. Lovell-Read c, R.N. Thompson



Interventions targeting non-symptomatic cases can be important to prevent local outbreaks: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study



Francesca A. Lovell-Read^{1,†}. Sebastian Funk³. Uri Obolski^{4,5} Christl A. Donnelly^{2,6} and Robin N. Thompson^{1,3,7,8}



Journal of Theoretical Biology



interventions in age-structured populations: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study Estimating local outbreak risks and the effects of non-pharmaceutical





Detecting Presymptomatic Infection Is Necessary to Forecast Major Epidemics in the Earliest Stages of Infectious Disease Outbreaks

Sustained transmission of Ebola in new locations: more likely than previously thought

> THE LANCET Infectious Diseases

Robin N Thompson, Katri Jalava, *Uri Obolski

INTERFACE








Reducing transmission in multiple settings is required to eliminate the risk of major Ebola outbreaks: a mathematical modelling study

Abbie Evans¹, William Hart¹, Stefano Longobardi², Rajat Desikan³, Anna Sher⁴ and Robin Thompson¹



Quantifying infectious disease epidemic risks: A practical approach for seasonal pathogens

Alexander R Kaye , Giorgio Guzzetta, Michael J Tildesley, Robin N Thompson



Heterogeneity in reporting rates

 $q_{i,j} = \text{Prob}(\text{no major epidemic} \mid i \text{ fast reporters}, j \text{ slow reporters})$

$$q_{1,0} = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta + \gamma^{(1)}} q_{2,0} + \frac{(1-\alpha)\beta}{\beta + \gamma^{(1)}} q_{1,1} + \frac{\gamma^{(1)}}{\beta + \gamma^{(1)}} q_{0,0},$$

$$q_{0,1} = \frac{\alpha\beta}{\beta + \gamma^{(2)}} q_{1,1} + \frac{(1 - \alpha)\beta}{\beta + \gamma^{(2)}} q_{0,2} + \frac{\gamma^{(2)}}{\beta + \gamma^{(2)}} q_{0,0}.$$





Artic

Novel Coronavirus Outbreak in Wuhan, China, 2020: Intense Surveillance Is Vital for Preventing Sustained Transmission in New Locations

Age structure

 $q_{i,j,k,...}$ = Prob(no major epidemic | i in age group 1, j in age group 2, k in age group 3,)












Estimating local outbreak risks and the effects of non-pharmaceutical interventions in age-structured populations: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study



Time-dependence

$$q(1,t) = q(2,t+\Delta t)\beta(t)N\Delta t + q(0,t+\Delta t)\mu\Delta t + q(1,t+\Delta t)(1-\beta(t)N\Delta t - \mu\Delta t).$$










Time-dependence


$$q(1,t) = q(2,t+\Delta t)\beta(t)N\Delta t + q(0,t+\Delta t)\mu\Delta t + q(1,t+\Delta t)(1-\beta(t)N\Delta t - \mu\Delta t).$$

$$\frac{dq_1(t)}{dt} = -\beta(t)q_1(t)^2 + (\beta(t) + \mu(t))q_1(t) - \mu(t).$$












Other factors (vaccination, within-host dynamics)






communications

medicine

ARTICLE

The risk of SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in low prevalence settings following the removal of travel restrictions

Rahil Sachak-Patwa¹, Helen M. Byrne ¹, Louise Dyson ^{2,3} & Robin N. Thompson ^{2,3}





PNAS

RESEARCH ARTICLE
BIOPHYSICS AND COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY
APPLIED MATHEMATICS

OPEN ACCESS

Analysis of the risk and pre-emptive control of viral outbreaks accounting for within-host dynamics: SARS-CoV-2 as a case study

William S, Hart^{ah,1} , Hyeongki Park^b, Yong Dam Jeong^{hc}, Kwang Su Kim^{hd}, Raiki Yoshimura^h, Robin N. Thompson^{ae,0} , and Shingo Iwami^hishiyk²

Assessing Epidemic Risks – Summary

models can be used to
estimate the Epidemic
Risk (the probability that
an imported case leads to
a major epidemic)


can be generated
analytically, informed by
using outbreak data, and
adjusted in real-time

Estimates can be extended to include a range of features, including heterogeneity in reporting rates, age structure and temporal heterogeneity

1. Using mathematical models to estimate outbreak risks

- Read "A practical guide to mathematical models for estimating infectious disease outbreak risks" by Southall et al.
- Derive the probability of a major outbreak starting from 1 infected individual for the stochastic SIR model (the "theoretical" result).
- Simulate the stochastic SIR model lots of times (each time starting from 1 infected individual), and calculate the proportion of simulations that are "major outbreaks" according to a definition of your choice (e.g. total number of infections exceeding 50 before disease dies out and I hits 0).
- Consider different possible definitions of a major outbreak, and investigate when the simulation-based probability of a major outbreak is matched by the theoretical value.

Possible definitions include: total infections exceeding x, maximum concurrent I exceeding x, outbreak lasting for more than x days, etc....



2. Using mathematical models to estimate outbreak risks


- Read "A practical guide to mathematical models for estimating infectious disease outbreak risks" by Southall et al.
- Derive the probability of a major outbreak starting from 1 infected for the stochastic SIR model. Test against model simulations (proportion of simulations in which at least 50 infections occur, say). Plot the probability of a major outbreak as a function of R_0 .
- Derive the probability of a major outbreak for another model of your choice for example, the children-adults model in Southall *et al.* (section 4.2 of that paper; can you reproduce Fig 4?).
- Longer term extension: Consider the probability of a major outbreak for a model with multiple age groups (derive equations, solve them numerically). Contact matrices that can be used to inform infection rates between ages are available for different countries in the supplementary material of "Projecting social contact matrices in 152 countries using contact surveys and demographic data" by Prem *et al.*

Outline


- 1. Introduction to common infectious disease outbreak models
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- 2. Early in an outbreak: Assessing the risk of major epidemics
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- 4. At the end of an epidemic: Assessing when the epidemic is over
 - End-of-outbreak probability estimation [compartmental model and renewal equation model]
 - Possible mini project

During an outbreak

Can we quantify pathogen transmissibility in real-time?



- Estimating changes in disease transmissibility (to e.g. assess the efficacy of current interventions)







Thompson et al., Epidemics, 2019

Two important quantities


Time dependent reproduction number





Generation time/ serial interval



Renewal equation model








Bayes'rule:
$$P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(B \mid A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

$$P(I_{t} = x \mid R_{t}, \{w_{s}\}, \{I_{0}, I_{1}, I_{2}, \dots, I_{t-1}\})$$



$$P(R_t | I_t = x, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{t-1}\})$$




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$$P(R_t | I_t = x, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{t-1}\})$$

Generates estimates of $R_{\rm t}$ that are highly sensitive to randomness in $I_{\rm t}$ Solution: Consider constant $R_{\rm t}$ over a window $\{t-\tau,t-\tau$ +1,... $t\}$




Bayes'rule:
$$P(A \mid B) = \frac{P(B \mid A)P(A)}{P(B)}$$

$$P(I_{t-\tau} = x_{t-\tau}, ..., I_t = x_t | R_t, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, ..., I_{t-\tau-1}\})$$


$$P(R_t | I_{t-\tau} = x_{t-\tau}, ... I_t = x_t, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, ..., I_{t-\tau-1}\})$$


Solution: Consider constant $R_{\rm t}$ over a window $\{t-\tau, t-\tau +1, \dots t\}$




Special case: If the prior for $R_{\rm t}$ is a gamma distribution with shape parameter α and rate parameter β , then the posterior for R_t is also a gamma distribution with

Shape parameter: $\alpha+\sum_{k=0}^{\tau}I_{t-k}$ Rate parameter: $\beta+\sum_{k=0}^{\tau}I_{t-k}\sum_{s=1}^{t-k-1}I_{t-k-s}w_s$






Window length: τ days



Cori *et al.*, Am. J. Epi., 2013 Thompson *et al.*, Epidemics, 2019

Uncertainty in the serial interval, imported cases






Thompson et al., Epidemics, 2019

Imported cases


Imported cases have not been infected locally



Temporally aggregated data

Data are often not reported daily

 $E(I_{t} \mid R_{t}, \{w_{s}\}, \{I_{0}, I_{1}, I_{2}, \dots, I_{t-1}\}) = R_{t} \sum_{s=1}^{t} I_{t-s} w_{s}$







Epidemics




A simulation-based approach for estimating the time-dependent reproduction number from temporally aggregated disease incidence time series data

I. Ogi-Gittins ^{a,b}, W.S. Hart ^c, J. Song ^d, R.K. Nash ^e, J. Polonsky ^f, A. Cori ^e, E.M. Hill ^{a,b}, N. Thompson ^{c, e}


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Data are often not reported daily

Temporally aggregated data



Temporally aggregated data








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* Mademakic Justines, Deismitty of Warnick, Conneys CW 7AL, UK
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Stochastic under-reporting










S. Hill EM. Thompson RN. 2025 Simulation

incidence time series data aggregated and under-reported disease incidence time series data. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 383: 20240412.


Isaac Ogi-Gittins^{1,2}, Nicholas Steyn³, Jonathan Polonsky⁵, William S. Hart⁴, Mory Keita^{7,6}, Steve Ahuka-Mundeke⁸, Edward M. Hill^{9,10} and Robin

Simulation-based inference of the time-dependent reproduction number from temporally aggregated and under-reported disease

Warning: model inputs may change during an epidemic



Hart et al. (eLife, 2022)



Hart et al. (Lancet Inf Dis, 2022)



Estimating changes in pathogen transmissibility – Summary

Bayesian inference
methods can be used to
estimate reproduction
numbers in real-time
during epidemics; these
approaches were used
worldwide for COVID-19

is important (e.g.
imported vs local cases)
and methods can be
adapted for use with
temporally aggregated
data

Care is needed to ensure that **model inputs are accurate**

3. Using mathematical models to infer changes in disease transmission during an outbreak

- Write code that takes the following as inputs: i) disease incidence time series; ii) discrete serial interval distribution; iii) parameters of the (gamma distributed) prior for R_t ; iv) window length τ ; and generates a plot of R_t vs t (for $t > \tau$) including 95% credible intervals.
- Download data for i and ii from EpiEstim App (https://shiny.dide.imperial.ac.uk/epiestim/).
- Compare results generated by your code from results generated using EpiEstim App (if you prefer, rather than using the app you could use the R software package EpiEstim and use inbuilt datasets from that package).
- Find a disease dataset online and apply your code to a new dataset.
- Longer term project. Extend the model to differentiate between imported cases and local cases as described in "Improved inference of time-varying reproduction numbers during infectious disease outbreaks" by Thompson *et al.*

Key references:

- "New framework and software to estimate time-varying reproduction numbers during epidemics" by Cori et al.
- "Improved inference of time-varying reproduction numbers during infectious disease outbreaks" by Thompson *et al.*

Outline

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At the end of an outbreak

When can an outbreak be declared over?

The New York Times

Sierra Leone Declared Free of Ebola Transmissions









People in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on Saturday, after the country passed 42 days without an Ebola case. Aurelie Marrier D'Unienvil/Associated Press

Uganda declares end to latest ebola outbreak

By Elias Biryabarema


April 26, 2025 8:30 AM GMT+1 · Updated 4 days ago



WHO recommended criteria for declaring the end of the Ebola virus disease outbreak

Technical information note - updated 4 March 2020

The acute phase of the outbreak is defined by the propagation of the virus within communities through transmission of the virus from one person to another. This phase will be considered to have been interrupted when no confirmed or probable Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases are detected for a period of 42 days (i.e. twice the maximum incubation period for Ebola infections) since the last potential exposure to the last case occurred.



PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS B


royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb

Rigorous surveillance is necessary for high confidence in end-of-outbreak declarations for Ebola and other infectious diseases

Research



Robin N. Thompson^{1,2,3}, Oliver W. Morgan⁴ and Katri Jalava⁵



How long is it necessary to wait before declaring an outbreak over?

PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS B

 $royal society publishing. or {\it g/journal/rstb}$


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




Robin N. Thompson^{1,2,3}, Oliver W. Morgan⁴ and Katri Jalava⁵

Initial analysis:





PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS B

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
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
Research



Robin N. Thompson^{1,2,3}, Oliver W. Morgan⁴ and Katri Jalava⁵

Initial analysis:





PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS B

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
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Research




Robin N. Thompson^{1,2,3}, Oliver W. Morgan⁴ and Katri Jalava⁵

Provides a "general rule" based on the time since the last observed case



End-of-outbreak declarations based solely on the time since the previous observed case fail to reflect outbreak-specific effects on the end-of-outbreak probability



End-of-outbreak declarations based solely on the time since the previous observed case fail to reflect outbreak-specific effects on the end-of-outbreak probability

IDEA: Take a specific disease incidence time series and calculate:

P(no future cases)



Objective Determination of End of MERS Outbreak, South Korea, 2015

Hiroshi Nishiura, Yuichiro Miyamatsu, Kenji Mizumoto

Author affiliations: The University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (H. Nishiura, Y. Miyamatsu, Kenji Mizumoto); Japan Science and Technology Agency, Kawaguchi Saitama, Japan (H. Nishiura, Y. Miyamatsu, K. Mizumoto)

International Journal of Infectious Diseases 110 (2021) 15-20



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International Journal of Infectious Diseases

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijid



A hospital-related outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 associated with variant Epsilon (B.1.429) in Taiwan: transmission potential and outbreak containment under intensified contact tracing, January–February 2021



Andrei R. Akhmetzhanov^{a,*}, Sung-mok Jung^{b,c}, Hao-Yuan Cheng^d, Robin N. Thompson^{e,f}

Nishiura *et al.* derived an outbreakspecific approximation of the end-ofoutbreak probability under a branching process transmission model

International Journal of Infectious Diseases 105 (2021) 286-292



International Journal of Infectious Diseases

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijid

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect




Localized end-of-outbreak determination for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19): examples from clusters in Japan





Natalie M. Linton^{a,b}, Andrei R. Akhmetzhanov^{a,c}, Hiroshi Nishiura^{a,b,*}


- ^a Graduate School of Medicine, Hokkaido University, Kita 15 Jo Nishi 7 Chome, Kita-ku, Sapporo-shi, Hokkaido, 060-8638, Japan
- ^b Kyoto University School of Public Health, Yoshidakonoecho, Sakyoku, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan
- ^c College of Public Health, National Taiwan University, 17 Xu-Zhou Road, Taipei, 10055, Taiwan

Transmission model










INPUT 3: Offspring distribution

INPUT 4: Transmission tree


Exact calculation of end-of-outbreak probabilities using contact tracing data royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif

> N. V. Bradbury^{1,2,†}, W. S. Hart^{3,†}, F. A. Lovell-Read³, J. A. Polonsky⁴ and R. N. Thompson³

Ebola in DRC (2017)



Nipah in Bangladesh (2004)




INTERFACE

royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif

Exact calculation of end-of-outbreak probabilities using contact tracing data


N. V. Bradbury^{1,2,†}, W. S. Hart^{3,†}, F. A. Lovell-Read³, J. A. Polonsky⁴ and R. N. Thompson³

Ebola in DRC (2017)



Problem: Transmission tree is often unknown...

Nipah in Bangladesh (2004)



INTERFACE


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Exact calculation of end-of-outbreak probabilities using contact tracing data

N. V. Bradbury $^{1,2,\uparrow}$, W. S. $Hart^{3,\dagger}$, F. A. Lovell-Read 3 , J. A. Polonsky 4 and R. N. Thompson 3

If the transmission tree is unknown, then the end-of-outbreak probability can be considering "all possible transmission trees":

 $\mathbb{P}(\text{no future cases}) = \sum_{i} \mathbb{P}(\text{no future cases} \mid \text{transmission tree } i) \times \mathbb{P}(\text{transmission tree } i)$



SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

Optimizing the timing of an end-of-outbreak declaration Hart *et al.*

- WHO declares Ebola outbreaks over after 42 "case-free" days
- Simple rules of thumb for end-of-outbreak declarations can be tested using repeated model simulation (of e.g. stochastic compartmental models) but these are not "outbreak specific"
- Under a branching process model, Nishiura et al. derived an approximation to the end-of-outbreak probability
 - The end-of-outbreak probability can be calculated exactly under the same model, if the transmission tree is known (Bradbury et al.)
- If the transmission tree is not known, an unbiased estimate of the end-of-outbreak probability can be calculated by enumerating over all possible transmission trees (or using MCMC to estimate the transmission tree; Hart et al.)


An alternative (easier) modelling framework


Instead of using compartmental models or individual-based branching processes, an alternative modelling framework involves renewal equations

[same model as described earlier, but assuming constant *R*]

An alternative (easier) modelling framework

Instead of using compartmental models or individual-based branching processes, an alternative modelling framework involves renewal equations





$$E(I_t \mid R, \{w_s\}, \{I_0, I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{t-1}\}) = R \sum_{s=1}^{t} I_{t-s} w_s$$

 $I_{\rm t}$ cases \longrightarrow Draw from Poisson distribution or NB distribution

An alternative (easier) modelling framework

Instead of using compartmental models or individual-based branching processes, an alternative modelling framework involves renewal equations

End of outbreak probability:

$$\prod_{j=t}^{\infty} \expigg(-R\sum_{s=1}^{j-1}I_{j-s}w_sigg)$$
 Poisson model

$$\prod_{j=t}^{\infty} \left(\frac{k}{k + R \sum_{s=1}^{j-1} I_{j-s} w_s} \right)^k$$


NB model

Case study: Ebola virus disease in DRC

1. Estimate *R* (and *k*) pre-ERT

$$L\left(R
ight) = rac{1}{M_{1}} \prod_{t=2}^{49} rac{\left(R \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} I_{t-s} w_{s}
ight)^{I_{t}} \exp\left(-R \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} I_{t-s} w_{s}
ight)}{I_{t}!}$$

2. Calculate risk of future cases each day if the ERT is withdrawn



Risk of withdrawing ERT on day t

$$=1-\int_0^\infty \operatorname{Prob} \ (ext{no cases from day} \ t \ ext{onwards} |R) \ L(R) \mathrm{d}R,$$




Using real-time modelling to inform the 2017

Ebola outbreak response in DR Congo

R. Thompson ®¹⊠, W. Hart ®¹, M. Keita²³, I. Fall⁴, A. Gueye², D. Chamla², M. Mossoko⁵, S. Ahuka-Mundeke⁵, J. Nsio-Mbeta⁵, T. Jombart² & J. Polons

Case study: Ebola virus disease in DRC






icle https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-49888

Using real-time modelling to inform the 2017 Ebola outbreak response in DR Congo

Case study: Ebola virus disease in DRC



- ERT effective at limiting transmission
- ERT was only withdrawn when it was safe to do so

nature communications 8

Arti


https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-49888-5

Using real-time modelling to inform the 2017 Ebola outbreak response in DR Congo

eived: 12 February 2024 R. Thompson ® M. Mossoko⁵, S

R. Thompson ⊕ 1 ⊆, W. Hart ⊕ 1, M. Keita 23, I. Fall 4, A. Gueye 2, D. Chamla 2, M. Mossoko 5, S. Ahuka-Mundeke 5, J. Nsio-Mbeta 5, T. Jombart 7 & J. Polonsky ⊕ 1

Effect of under-reporting



Infectious Disease Modelling

Real-time inference of the end of an outbreak: Temporally aggregated disease incidence data and under-reporting


 $\frac{\text{I. Ogi-Gittins}^{\,1\,2},\text{J. Polonsky}^{\,3},\text{M. Keita}^{\,4\,5},\text{S. Ahuka-Mundeke}^{\,6}, \\ \underline{\text{W.S. Hart}}^{\,7}, \\ \underline{\text{M.J. Plank}}^{\,8}, \\ \underline{\text{B. Lambert}}^{\,9}, \\ \underline{\text{E.M. Hill}}^{\,10\,11}, \\ \underline{\text{R.N. Thompson}}^{\,7} \overset{\boxtimes}{\sim} \\ \underline{\text{M.S. Mart}}^{\,7}, \\ \underline{\text{M.J. Plank}}^{\,8}, \\ \underline{\text{M.J. Plank$

- Renewal equation models provide a framework for inferring the end-of-outbreak probability straightforwardly (obtaining outbreak-specific estimates)
- Estimates can be informed by outbreak data and adjusted as additional data arise
- An outbreak can be declared over when the inferred end-of-outbreak probability falls below a threshold reflecting a policy-makers' appetite for risk
 - Superspreading events can be accounted for by assuming a NB distributed number of cases each day
- Effective disease surveillance is essential to declare outbreaks over quickly and accurately following the final case

Possible mini project

4. Using mathematical models to determine when an outbreak is over

Write code that takes the following as inputs: i) a disease incidence time series; ii) a discrete serial interval distribution; iii) the value of R; iv) (for NB distribution only) the value of k; and generates estimates of the probability that no cases will occur in future (using the renewal equation method).



- Can you reproduce this figure? (for number of cases each day drawn from a Poisson distribution)
- Can you apply your methods to other datasets (e.g. the datasets suggested under project idea 3)? How long is it necessary to wait to be confident that an outbreak is over for different outbreaks/diseases?

Figure 5.5: Calculation of the end-of-outbreak probability using a renewal equation model. Blue bars represent the number of infections each day, and the red line represents the end-of-outbreak probability estimate based on the infections arising prior to the current day. The end-of-outbreak probability was calculated assuming that $R_t = 1.2$ for all values of t and $\{w_s\}_{s=1}^{11} = \{0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.02, 0.02, 0.01\}$ with $w_s = 0$ for $s \ge 11$.

Summary

- Infectious disease models exist in a range of forms (here: compartmental models and renewal equations)
 - Certain models may be more suitable to answer specific questions
- Compartmental models are flexible and can easily include different epidemiology
 - Renewal equations simply track case numbers
 - Epidemiological models can be used to answer different questions at different outbreak stages (e.g., early in an outbreak = assess PMO, middle of an outbreak = estimate R_t , late in outbreak = assess when outbreak has finished).

https://www.maths.ox.ac.uk/groups/mathematical-biology/infectious-disease-modelling

- Assign groups
- Get started on an infectious disease modelling mini project (come up with some interesting plots to show next week ☺)
 - Finish project (and 3-5 slides) next Monday
 - Report back on Tuesday

Can each group please send 3-5 slides to me by noon next Tuesday?